Mill's characterization of human motivation in terms of pleasure is simplistic and I like how Blackburn uses Butler to point out his mistake. The satisfaction of some wants does bring pleasure, but as Butler and Blackburn both note "not all desires seem to bring 'pleasure' upon being gratified" (139). Human motivations and decisions are ruled by things besides pleasure. Butler distinguishes between an "object of my 'particular' desire," and "the pleasure" that comes from the satisfaction of that desire (138-139). As many things bring feelings besides pleasure, Mill's direct relationship between desire, action, and pleasure is false. Blackburn then discusses other ideas about human desires and choice. He mentions the idea of release, but state of mind is not always directly related to an action. Blackburn also explores the idea of a "change from a state of desire to one of fulfillment," but dislikes this on the basis that it "presupposes a preceding desire," as the desire for change is secondary (141). Thus choice is not merely ruled by desire and pleasure, as Mill proposed. I am much more convinced by the idea that humans are motivated by concerns not mere pleasure. For example, an individual is concerned about the survival of the whales rather than acting for the pleasure derived from the survival of the whales. I particularly liked the Gauthier quote used that, "it is not interests in the self, that take oneself as object, but interests of the self, held by oneself as subject, that provide the basis for rational choice and action" (162).
Throughout this semester, we have discussed the idea of self-interest as encompassing more than merely economic personal gain and Blackburn delves into this issue. I find myself persuaded by this idea that we are motivated by interests of the self not in the self. Blackburn works to bridge the divide between benevolence and self-interest by arguing that "any such concern [such as benevolence] may be one of the particular (first-order) concerns whose satisfaction goes to making up our own self-interest" (143). I'm curious to see if other people found this to be an interesting and potentially persuading idea? Can self-interest encompass altruism and benevolence as Butler and Blackburn propose?
I think Blackburn only means to point out that there isn't a conflict between self-interest and altruism/benevolence, not that the former encompasses the latter. Self-interest is one of many desires/motivations that drive our behaviour, I think that's something I'd agree with. I agree with Blackburn: psychological egoism is bunk.
ReplyDeleteI found Blackburn's version to be rather convincing, as it permits self-interest to encompass more than other narrowly defined accounts. Self-interest based on utility does not account for the many motivations individuals have when they act, and the different types of satisfaction they receive from doing so. Furthermore, individuals have emotions far more complex than pleasure and pain, and the combination of opposing ones toward a situation will cause an individual to act- even if they could not both gain happiness and avoid some level of unhappiness at the same time.
ReplyDeleteI'm glad that you pointed out the interests OF the self vs interests IN the self distinction that Blackburn uses Gauthier to make. But isn't the point that only someone all of whose interests are interests IN herself is in any non-trivial sense self-interested, and that if self-interest is defined by saying that all of someone's interests are interests OF herself, then self-interest is vacuous -- not matter how one acts, on such an account, and no matter what one's goals (e.g. completely altruistic), one is self-interested?
ReplyDeleteI would agree with XY. It seems like Blackburn is arguing that all actions taken by eligible agents (where eligible stems from possessing defined preferences, even if those preferences are intentionally inconsistent, and whereas preference is not so narrow and hedonistic (166)) seek to align with what most concerns them. In doing so, an eligible agent will always be maximizing their utility, as their utility is predicated upon what most concerns them, a point better-illustrated by the distinction between empirical and theoretical games. If you do something, like display altruism, then your actions "just show where your concerns lay" - that you attached more expected utility to one choice than another. I think this is what Party Paul was getting at - there is no action under Blackburn's conception that is "inconsistent with it," not that all actions are encompassed by it (167).
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