Goods beget goods and Social Value

While Grace commented on the culture of poverty thesis, I want to also address the "goods beget goods conception" and commend its ability to support Lebron's social value thesis. Last year, in political philosophy we had debates about affirmative action, and one widely acknowledged criticism is that affirmative action should target socioeconomic classes, not race. However, Lebron effectively describes why lack of certain resources is not sufficient to address racial inequality. Viewing race in terms of social value highlights why black individuals of a higher economic status face discriminatory practices as well. The issue of race relations delves far deeper than just the continued cycle of poverty that perpetuates racial inequalities. If institutions continue to enable racism, implicit or explicit, we cannot make progress towards an equal society. 

I would be interested to hear Lebron's views on affirmative action and whether it serves as a tool to remedy the shame we should feel, whether it enhances the agency of black individuals, and whether it is an appropriate practice for institutions to implement. 

Survival and success

"Middle-class whites with easy access to high-quality educational institutions and a social network comprised of similarly advantaged persons tend to think that Americans can be self-made achievers if they try hard enough. In contrast, many inner-city black youths find school one of the least worthwhile places to be. Real effort pays off in earning street respect rather than getting a good grade on a book report. Thus, it is entirely possible to place two representative persons who are nonetheless American and get starkly different outlooks on what is worth doing and how best to do it" (62).

This particular passage stuck out to me for effectively explaining the problem of how black culture is often critiqued; as individuals who not only have our basic needs met but are also predisposed to succeed- with access to top equation and access to numerous professional opportunities, it can be hard to even come to close to understanding the motivations of those who have far less. For many black youths, "succeeding" is not a goal because surviving must be. Many have a number of other stress factors that deter their focus: food, shelter, safety, and any combination of the three. Arguing that living this lifestyle should only be more of a motivation to somehow "try harder" and find a way out of the culture ignorantly neglects the way that struggle engrosses one's whole life. Being able to succeed (especially in upper-class terms) is a luxury- not a predetermined right- and ought to be understood as such.

I know that the idea of success plays a large role in American society and of course, individuals have many deferring opinions on the issue. I would like to explore even further the nature of the term, and how we can best conceive of it. Lebron's account helps to demonstrate how differing cultures (often defined by or at least influenced largely by race) may produce different definitions of the word, and how certain societal circumstances (like his version of implicit institutional injustice) lead individuals to look for success in non-traditional ways, such as criminal activities like drug-dealing or stealing. Although he does not condone nor justify such actions, Lebron successfully emphasizes the importance of understanding the nature of the problem as "historically and socially embedded power" (44).

Rationality of Unfortunate Decisions

Lebron presents Patrick Moynihan’s culture of poverty thesis. The thesis argues that “blacks are the cause of their disproportionate inequality because they have developed a culture that not merely embraces disadvantage but uses it as a wedge to blame society for their ills when in fact, their embrace of disadvantage has perpetrated a culture or shared way of life among blacks that justifies poor social, economic, and political choices” (49). Lebron responds by saying that this argument is ignorant of how disadvantage can deeply affect an individual’s agency and beliefs of his or her life prospects. He goes on to say that unfortunate decisions made by blacks are rational “in the face of radical institutional unfairness” (50). They are also not unethical as the structure of society is fundamentally unjust with regards to race.

I think it is important that conservative thinkers of racial equality and poverty understand Lebron’s arguments. However, I also believe that a middle ground approach is best when addressing this issue in a way that would result in tangible change in the lives of black people. I understand that Lebron defends the rationality of choices of blacks for the sake of trying to help outsiders have a better grasp on how social position influences one’s decisions. However, if all blacks understood their situation as Lebron understands it, would it not perpetuate the cycle of disproportionate inequality without blacks feeling empowered to act upon their circumstances to escape this cycle? Instead perhaps there can be a middle ground approach, one that takes into account obstacles that a group faces due to the problem of social value but also empowers them with the agency to make different choices, that would result in more tangible changes in their lives and more success stories like Lebron’s.

Any other thoughts in this claim that Lebron makes? It seems like it is quite a bold statement that is worth unpacking and for further discussion. 

Aspiration in Lebron and Beitz

This topic is more specific to chapter 1, but I don't think we touched on it too much (though a little in Tyler's/Tim's blog posts), and I think it's also still relevant to chapter 2/the book in general. I wanted to compare the "aspirational" aspect of shame for Lebron and the "aspirational" nature of human rights for Beitz. Lebron describes shame as serving an aspirational purpose: "Because we think justice is something we can do rather than receive as a result of fortune, it also indicates our common aspiration to be better, more good, and more upstanding. To the extent that we can fall short of these ambitions on account of error or confusion, and to the extent that shame can be instrumental in setting us straight, we should conceive of shame as something more than a means of criticism or prompting feelings of failure or guilt. Shame on this view can support our best aspirations in a manner beyond helping make our vision for a better way clearer; indeed, it can help bring our deliberations and actions into coherence with our prior affirmed ideals" (25). Beitz includes the idea of aspiration when saying that human rights are a practice and not a regime. Beitz says that "the idea of a regime focuses attention on explicit rules and formal procedures for their application. To some extent these elements are present for human rights, but an exclusive focus on them would fail to embrace the ways in which human rights function as standards of aspiration--for example, as bases of political criticism, elements of a shared moral language, and ideals that guide efforts at political change by individuals and nongovernmental organizations. . . . [Human rights] operate as goals of political change for nongovernmental actors and as a global analog of the public conception of justice found in well-ordered domestic societies (44).

I think it's interesting to see Lebron's aspirational account of shame in comparison with Beitz's aspirational account of human rights. Lebron, I think, does a better job of explaining why "aspiration" really is the right word to attach to how shame affects us; because shame comes as a result of a gap between our ideals and our actions, in particular, the social value we place on black lives, there is a clear distinction between where we are and where we aspire to be. Since Beitz's account is so empirical, though, I don't think it makes as much sense to attach "aspirational" to his account of human rights. True, we all aspire to respect and protect human rights, but Beitz's account does not do a particularly in-depth job of exactly what we should be aspiring to. Keeping in mind the supposedly "aspirational" nature of Beitz's human rights while reading Lebron (both chapters 1 and 2) has helped me see why Lebron's account of shame actually is aspirational. It also, as has been mentioned by a lot of other people in blog posts/class, is nice to have an account that, in being aspirational, actually shows us one way that we might be able to achieve what we aspire to.

Shame and Hope

I think its interesting that shame and hope, two emotions that seem antithetical, both play into Lebron's writing. He uses shame as a tool for improving American society; shame is a necessary step on the path away from racism within ourselves and our institutions. In order to remake our national character, the white citizens of America must first feel profound shame for the systemic racism that pervades society (whether willful or unconscious). Shame, as an emotion, lingers for a long time, never really going away. The shame you feel because you have wronged someone will often leave you to conclude you must rectify your mistake, although the nature of shame is such that you will never totally be able to make up for your wrongs. Yet, within shame, and within Lebron's writings, is a sense of hope about what can come after shame. One quote from Lebron highlighted this sense of hope, so I'll include it here: "To be a disadvantaged agent is not the same as being a determined agent. We retain the capacity to be better selves than we are. This is the value of mobilizing the idea of shame..." (13). This is far different picture than many political scientists paint because it includes a a sense of agency. Despite the systemic nature of racism, we as individuals can choose to understand the nature of the problem before us and feel shame that it still exists. While institutions are vital to eliminating racism, Lebron's argument vests power in the individual to work through the shame to become a better self, ultimately helping to reduce or eliminate systemic racism.

Timeless Ideas

Something of an open question on this, but I'm not quite understanding how Lebron can reject the process of moral reasoning to attain timeless principles, while simultaneously accepting other timeless principles, namely those he believes shame refers to. Lebron seems to set his argument in an attempt to establish a nonideal. In his words, his "aim is tot take the problem in view on its own terms and respond to it as the problem itself demands here and now." (5). He goes on to reject the overlapping consensus as ahistorical. But, at some level, his arguments seem to rest on the notion of certain principles, namely that everyone is due equal respect. Lebron simply takes these principles to be just on their own accord, which might make some sense as we're talking about values we would assume everyone would agree on. But to someone like Rawls, principles become legitimate precisely because they are timeless - they would be accepted by any reasonable person at any time. Lebron, though, wants to accept other principles he assumes are already legitimate and timeless, even though he thinks the original position has a major flaw. This leads to the situation where Lebron has simultaneously accepted certain principles (or, alternatively, people have accepted certain deep principles that can be exploited) while rejecting a scenario where they can be created. Perhaps Lebron doesn't have much of a problem here though. His theory is not as broad as Rawls, in the sense that it does not wish to redesign a basic structure or rethink justice. Rather, it seeks to look at issues of institutional practice and the failings of that practice. Since that's the case, his theory can afford to be much more narrow.

The Individual and the Institution

In my last post I began to touch on the relationship between individuals and institutions in shaping national character. I felt like there was more to say on this topic. 

There is an interesting relationship between the role of individuals and institutions in Lebron's conception of national character. He wants for us to "cultivate moral excellence" at both levels, but it is somewhat unclear as to which can or should come first. He argues that national character encompasses "our self-understanding as agents possessing the power to act morally or not," indicating the significance of our attitudes and actions as individuals. He then turns to the institutional level, examining "the way circumstances of power interact with the agency of the disadvantaged" (3). These circumstances of power are predicated on historical relationships and structures, and Lebron claims that Rawls' ideas of justice are justified on premises that neglect this fact. For racial injustice to be "systemic" it must be a part of a system. And, in our system of institutions "themselves beholden to racial historical precedent" we find them passing on "bad moral lessons," that, due to their institutional origins, are granted moral worth without dispute. How could something less than morally worthy come from our morally superior democratic system, after all? It seems that institutions fail to show us "racial inequality as driven by historical relations of power," and instead are responsible for perpetuating and legitimizing our uneven distribution of social value (5). 

Lebron then moves on to the role of the individual with his anecdote that Anna touched on. When his peer made an offensive joke, he felt that the man had "betrayed more deeply held principles" that we as people should maintain (7). He seems to change his tune, claiming that "most of the necessary rules are in place" to improve our national character, but that "the players sometimes seem unwilling to play by the spirit of the rules" (8). In the face of race, we fall short individually as well. 

I think that these inconsistencies only show up when reading Lebron incorrectly. It seems that he uses the individual and the institution interchangeably, or at least sees that they are greatly connected. If "good persons must stand alongside good institutions for justice to take hold," then we are both actors in the process of reforming "our individual selves and the polity as a collective" (6).