In Sec. I, Chapter III, Smith begins by writing that the following:
“When the original passions of the person principally concerned are in perfect concord with the sympathetic emotions of the spectator, they necessarily appear to this last just and proper, and suitable to their objects; and, on the contrary, when upon bringing the case home to himself, he finds that they do not coincide with what he feels, they necessarily appear to him unjust and improper, and unsuitable to the causes which excite him.” (11)
This seems a
bit problematic, for if justice is derived from feelings about another, this requires emotion to be at the centerpiece of a just system. The impartial spectator, however, is built upon the idea of reason. Being impartial, by definition, requires one to abandon emotions to critically evaluate the situation around them. But, to be just, one also has to be emotional, as that is the only way we know who deserves sympathy in a situation. Smith's solution to this problem is for people to constrain emotions to make them understandable to others, and it would seem like his impartial spectator would have an emotive capacity, but not be beholden to it. The problem with this is that it still seems to require the impartial spectator to abandon some of her impartiality. Given the power that emotions can hold over people, it seems odd to suggest simultaneously that emotions explain much of human interaction, but that they can be abandoned as needed (which, to remain truly impartial, they would have to be). For Smith, reconciling a fluctuating justice with sympathy is no easy task.
I agree that there certainly is a conflict here, as while sympathy (and understanding emotion) certainly plays a large role in Smith's account of maintaining justice in society, the impartial bystander must be able to discern which emotion or appeal is most valid, or to separate themselves from emotion entirely. These are near-impossible feats when the bystander, receptive to it, is also overcome with emotion.
ReplyDeleteI think Smith would respond by claiming that an impartial bystander does not need to abandon emotion entirely in order to be impartial, but that the bystander must instead be able to interpret and judge the sentiments of others as he or she would judge his or her own, giving them just as much consideration and validity as they would afford to themselves. For the bystander, "his own sentiments are the standards and measures by which he judges of mine," and therefore to approve or disapprove of the sentiments of others is no more than to "observe their agreement or disagreement with our own" (17). While this may not be the most accurate way of approaching impartiality, it seems like Smith's definition does not match your own. Bystanders must not abandon emotion, but use their own perceptions of it as a standard with which to evaluate others'.