Wednesday, March 4, 2015
A start on Smith and virtue...
I find Smith's idea of human virtue very interesting, especially because it seems to contradict with his general image of the self-interested economist. Smith discusses two sets of virtues, "the soft, the gentle, the amiable virtues, the virtues of candid condescension and indulgent humanity," and "the great, the awful, and the respectable, the virtues of self-denial, of self-government..." (19) I find these two sets interesting, as they are clearly opposites and in his initial description Smith points out seemingly problematic qualities of each of the sets. Indeed, it is easy to think about how something like loyalty might be a virtue, but at the same time loyalty without prudence seems to be a vice. Smith brings up this point that the extremes of either of the two types of virtues are bad, rather an individual must be balanced in order to be virtuous. "Virtue is excellence," meaning that people must go beyond the expected and easy to be virtuous (20). Virtue means a balance between the amiable and the great. Smith says that "to feel much for others, and little for ourselves, that to restrain our selfish, and to indulge our benevolent, affections, constitutes the perfection of human nature," as people must be amiable but must also possess self-command (20). I think this view of virtue is pretty convincing, as he goes above and beyond mere propriety to a greater sense of virtue.
Subscribe to:
Post Comments (Atom)
I agree that Smith's view of virtue is rather convincing. To add on to what you say about his virtues of "self-denial, of self-government," he takes an interesting position when he acknowledges that "...the weakest of the mortals is capable of exerting" self-command and that in a "common degree of the moral, there is no virtue" (30). However, he goes on to note that in there are some situations which require "the greatest exertions of self-command" (31), the individual may deserve some applause and may even be considered virtuous although the action is not in perfect propriety. This note exemplifies the difference between propriety and virtue for Smith as we see passion (and extraordinariness ) to be at the foundation of virtue.
ReplyDelete