In
the first chapter, Rawls explains the difference between a concept and
conception of justice. He writes, “the concept of justice I take to be defined,
then, by the role of principles in assigning rights and duties and in defining
the appropriate division of social advantages. A conception of justice is an
interpretation of this role” (Rawls, 9). If conception is the interpretation of
concept, is it possible to have a just concept, but an unjust conception?
To
examining the idea of opposing conception and concept of justice, let’s imagine
that the pairing of conception and concept is relevantly similar to a house and
its blueprint: a house is an interpretation of a blueprint in the same way a
conception is an interpretation of a concept. It is possible that a house’s
blueprint seems structurally sound, but the house itself, once build, is
unstable. Maybe, in similar way, the concept is just, but the conception, or
the concept’s interpretation, is unjust. The best example I think of this might
be dichotomy between the declaring all men are created equal and then denying
Black Americans the right to vote, among many other things. It is just to
profess, as rule of distributing rights and duties, that everyone is entitled
to the same rights. But somehow that conception of justice was lost in interpretation
when it came to giving Blacks the right to vote. If it’s possible to have a
just concept and an unjust conception, how can the just concept some how lost
in interpretation?
Nice distinction, and your example is a good one. Rawls wants to generalize it much more broadly. We have a shared concept of justice. That is, we all agree that we should live in a just society, and about certain general features that a just society will have. But we disagree dramatically about how this concept is properly rendered more specific -- into a workable conception. Conservative republicans and liberal democrats, for example, will in Rawls' view agree on the more general concept of justice, but disagree greatly about the specific conception of justice that properly fleshes out and implements this concept. Rawls' argument attempts to take us from the shared concept to a specific conception in a way that everyone who endorses the concept is committed to accepting.
ReplyDeleteI think this ties into what I just said. While on a broad scale, the distinction between concepts and conceptions of justice is perhaps blurrier and less-debated (i.e. denying someone the right to vote in a democratic society is unjust), as we get deeper and more specific, certain principles of social justice begin to distinguish us and we find fundamental differences (and sometimes, in retrospect, objective mistakes) in our interpretations based on these principles.
DeleteI feel that Rawls answers your question, at least to an extent (the reasons behind why we may have just concepts but fail to interpret just conceptions from them is perhaps another debate) by rooting his principles of justice, as Tim states in his post, not so much on the individual but on society, especially when speaking of the "efficiency, coordination, and stability" of social cooperation (6). As Rawls states, "the distinction between the concept and the various conceptions of justice" certainly allows for the two to be interpreted and acted upon differently by different people; they are different things (5). But, as Rawls continues, this distinction "settles no important questions," which I feel you seek answers for. Although he does not explicitly answer your question, Rawls does qualify that the reason your question exists (and the reason such unjust interpretations can exist) is largely based on "fundamental societal problems" of efficiency, coordination, and stability, because "some measure of agreement in conceptions of justice is... not the only prerequisite" for a viable community (5). Just because many of us (and hopefully all of us) agree that denying Black Americans the right to vote is an unjust interpretation of equality does not mean that all interpretations will be just. The fundamental social problems that Rawls identifies remain.
ReplyDeleteAs Tim mentions, Rawls immediately expands his notion of justice to account for people as a part of society; individuals are certainly affected by actions taken based on interpretations of justice but it is the society that regulates this "public conception of justice" (4). And, just to justify his presupposition that men would choose to live in a society, Rawls states that "social cooperation makes it possible" for men to enjoy better lives together than they would alone. Nothing ground-breaking. But, this presumed social coordination is imperfect, making it impossible to always ensure efficient "achievement of social ends," leading to a system that cannot always be "stable" (6). Where there is lacking stability, there are lacking "stabilizing forces" that might "restore the arrangement" of just conceptions and "prevent further violations" of, in this case, civil rights (6). And, just as social systems can be imperfect, principles of social justice can also be misguided. These principles, which "single out which similarities and differences among persons are relevant" as we, as an imperfect society, determine not only "rights and duties," but the "division of advantages" that are appropriate (5). So, without a certain "measure of agreement for what is just and unjust," which, as Tyler mentions, is always changing in Rawls' theory, individuals in a society might, on occasion, act upon unjust conceptions of otherwise just concepts. In singling out which similarities and differences constitute certain rights, duties, and advantages, our system can get things right or "appropriate" (i.e. denying convicted violent criminals the advantage of remaining on the street to possibly kill again). But, as you pointed out, it is this same imperfect system that allows us to make horrific mistakes (i.e. denying Black Americans the right to vote). We are where these distinctions come from, and, being aware of our own imperfections and past atrocities, we must therefore always evaluate our principles and conceptions of social justice.