I don't know whether it's odd for me think this way – or of it's just a show of hilarious sophomoric arrogance – but it seems to me that Brettschneider's understanding of democracy doesn't seem all that revolutionary.
A lot of it just seems to be a play of semantics, mainly what we take democracy to mean. I just feel that if we took Habermas' proceduralist theory and simply shifted the goal posts, the definition of democracy, more generally beyond that of simply democratic procedure (as process) to that of democracy as an institution, we'd get something remarkably similar to the value theory of democracy. I suppose Brettscheneider does a great job of articulating the key values of a democracy, but what does he do that Habermas doesn't? It seems to me that reciprocity is the most interesting of his three values (also, very Rawlsian) but it borrows heavily from Habermas. Just how inventive or innovative an approach was his value theory really? I must say I'm dubious.
XY, I actually had the same thought as I was reading. I thought his most interesting discussion was on limiting freedoms and democracy in military emergencies. However, I still didn't see this as that groundbreaking. Are we not looking hard enough? I could see his argument as being important in constitutional law.
ReplyDeleteOr are we intellectual sensationalist? Do we just want to read thinkers that kick the philosophical door in? I mean, Marx had some flare, and he was pretty fun to discuss.
An interesting challenge. He thinks that his account can solve the "problem of contraint" while others cannot, and that this has a great deal of importance for a proper understanding of democratic legitimacy. Or come at the problem a different way. Many people claim to endorse democracy, but not individual rights. So they reject the substantive accounts, and accept proceduralism that seems to allow for tyranny of the majority. On Brettschneider's view, however, such a position is flat out inconsistent. Democracy, properly understood as securing the conditions for the status of the people as rulers, as both authors and adressees of the law, dictates recognition of certain substantive rights. Why isn't this a powerful result, and a striking difference?
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