Although it does not seem like charity and slavery are closely linked, in chapter 9 Ripstein explains Kant's view that dependency on charity is very similar to slavery. Poverty is dependency, as "the poor are completely subject to the choice of those in more fortunate circumstances" (274). People in conditions of extreme poverty that rely on charity for their wellbeing are totally dependent on another's will. In this way, charity and slavery are both related due to the concept of choice. As Ripstein writes, "the moral outrage of slavery is the way in which one person is subject to the choice of another," but this is akin to charity (281). In both of these cases, an individual is dependent "on the grace of another" which "reduces a person to the status of a thing," which gives rise to moral outrage (282). Given this similarity between charity and slavery, Kant believes that needs must be met in the public sphere rather than the private. Poverty and dependence on charity "is institutional, because it is a consequence of the creation of enforceable property rights," so according to Kant, "support for the poor must be provided through taxes" (282). A state rules by a united will and dependency is inconsistent with this concept because a united will "is restricted by the laws the people could give themselves: they could not authorize a situation in which some are completely beholden to the choice of another" (279). As such, Ripstein explains that Kant argues for taxation and public institutions to care for people and eliminate poverty.
We have already talked some about the ideas of poverty and redistribution in class. I'm curious if anyone has any new thoughts on the topic after reading Chapter 9 of Ripstein. I find this account in favor of redistribution convincing, do other people feel similarly?
Yeah, I found it fairly convincing. Having said that I am pretty socialist so this may not be saying much.
ReplyDeleteProf. Ripstein's application of Kant reminded me in some ways of Rawls' political conception. Both provide internal justifications of redistribution. Rawls had said that active engagement of the will from the part of individuals obligated states to look out for their interests. Ripstein/Kant say that a legitimate state must have equal opportunity, take care of poverty etc. because it’s the only way to establish a “rightful condition” where people share in the general will. I liked the way Lockean/Nozickian claims are deflected: property claims only exist after a rightful condition is secured.
Notice, though, that there may well be significant differences between Rawls' account and the account that Ripstein attributes to Kant. For example, Kant does not defend fair equality of opportunity, in Rawls' sense, but formal equality of opportunity, something more akin to what Rawls characterizes as "careers open to talents." Rawls takes such merely formal equality of opportunity to be inadequate, but Kant holds that it is the most that can be justified. Similarly, poverty needs to be alleviated to secure a rightful condition. But might it not be that the difference principle also violates a rightful condition, by going beyond what is necessary to secure the conditions of equal individual freedom, and violating the individual freedom of those being taxed?
ReplyDeleteWould it be possible to reframe Kant's views to accommodate the Rawls' more generous conception? If I hold "poverty" and "education" to be flexible minimums that are relative to a given standard (which I think is fair! Maybe using the difference principle, to appropriate Rawls entirely), maybe it's possible to reconcile the two accounts.
ReplyDelete