One of the central question concerning Beitz's account of human rights is what it means to characterize global human rights as a "practice." He tells us on p. 42 that a practice consists of 1)a set of rules, 2)a belief ("more or less widespread") that they ought to be followed, and 3)institutions to propagate and implement them. The suggestion is clearly that a system of domestic law is a practice, but the suggestion also seems to be that the practice of human rights is not a legal practice. Is science a practice? Is chess a practice? Is beer pong a practice? Asking these kinds of questions might help us get a handle on what it means to identify human rights as a practice. Notice that natural rights, the moral rights identified by many of our authors, are not a practice. If enough people believe that natural moral human rights ought to be followed and set up institutions to propagate them, then they will be bound up in a practice. But without the acceptance of any such rules and the institutions to propagate them they are not part of a practice. Notice also that no agreement is necessary for the existence of a practice. It could easily emerge through an invisible hand process with no agreement whatsoever; but still count as a practice. Notice finally that when it comes to practices the question of whether a practice exists and the question of whether one ought to support, propagate, and value it, are two completely different questions. We could agree that a practice exists, e.g. slavery in the U.S. South, but think that it is an evil practice that should be abolished. It consisted in a set of rules, widespread belief that they ought to be followed, and institutions to propagate and implement them, but they were immoral, even evil -- part of a practice that should be undermined and abolished, not endorsed. So the question of whether human rights are properly understood to be a practice does not answer the question of whether we should support such a practice. Intriguing!
PS Someone new should run the Q! Let me know if you would like to run it tomorrow, and follow in the awesome footsteps of Francesca, Cole, XY, and Tim.
I find it interesting that Beitz clearly states that human rights are not a regime. He makes several distinctions about what makes the practice of human rights different from a regime. He argues that regimes have "institutional capacities for the authoritative resolution of disputes...and for the application of sanctions," but this is notably lacking in international human rights (43). Beitz also says that regimes are created for mutual benefit and that this is not always the case for human rights. Lastly, he says that regimes often have formal rules and procedures for application. As international human rights lack this clear formalization, Beitz says a human rights regime is a mischaracterization. I'm not entirely sure how Beitz determines all of these requirements from the definition of a regime as "a set of 'implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations tend to converge' " (43). As there is often talk of an international human rights regime, I am interested in this distinction. Is Beitz correct in his characterization of human rights as a practice rather than a regime? Also, how much does it matter if international human rights are thought of as a practice versus a regime? Beitz says that human rights are an "emergent practice," as it lacks maturity, but why couldn't this apply to the regime concept?
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