Beitz changes the question from how we ought to define human rights to how human rights are currently used on the international political scale. He develops his "'practical conception,'" which takes "doctrine and practice of human rights as we find them in international political life as the source materials for constructing a conception of human rights" (102). Beitz does not deny the importance of defining human rights, but instead focuses on creating an empirical account of how human rights are generally used as an existing global practice.
I was initially skeptic in my reception of Beitz account; does focusing on the practical use of human rights neglect the value in striving for a comprehensive version of human rights? Does using the term human rights affect how we understand "rights" as fundamental claims? I now see the strength of Beitz's practical approach: by differentiating between human rights as a moral tool (one that may develop in different ways) and as a generally-accepted set of international standards, Beitz adequately explains the importance in understanding how human rights are currently used.
One final comment- I think that given Beitz approach, he should emphasize the role that both states and individuals ought to play in regulating the accepted standards of human rights. If human rights are (and continue to be) our standard of international socioeconomic justice, we must all play an active role in regulating what these norms are and how they are enforced.
What is everyone else's take on Beitz's approach?
I think Beitz does a good job of illuminating common misconceptions that arise when we think about human rights, especially when he describes the fallacies of the agreement theory. For example, he notes, "why should the perception of agreement, rather than a recognition of the importance of the interests protected by human rights, motivate commitment" (81). I also think his distinction between paternalism and protectivism is insightful and should be regarded in considerations of appropriate human rights interventions. I do not know that he offers a convincing account of human rights and share some of Tyler's worries, but his work does offer value in thinking about the "language" of human rights.
ReplyDeleteI suspect that Beitz would agree with Francesca's recommendation. If human rights are properly understood as the two tiered discursive international practice that he says they are, then we should give a lot more attention to the content of that practice, and potential revision to aspects of that content.
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