On Fiona and Brettschneider

Last seminar, Fiona was concerned that in democracies someone, probably in the minority, would be dependent on the will of another, who is in the majority. This dependence seems unjust because it deprives the individual freedom to do what they choose without the constraint of others. I think Brettschneider is concerned with a similar question about how individuals must be rulers while being addressees of laws. Brettschneider thinks that Dworkin poses an interesting question. Dworkin writes, “ ‘Why am I free—how could I be thought to be governing myself—when I must obey what other people decide even if I think it wrong?’”(33). Drowkin argues that freedom can’t be maintained in a procedural democracy where the majority, or at least some fraction of the population, decides the rules by which others must behave. If our freedom can’t be preserved, as we are at the whim of others, how can a government legitimate force?

This seems related to the point Fiona raised about dependency a citizen might have in Kant’s system of government. Brettschneider argues that this outcome is not the product of self-government, and then not really undemocratic. To achieve self-government, there must be “substantive rights to legitimate treatment, even if they contradict the laws passed by those procedures” or a ‘moral membership’ (34). Without this moral membership, and only a procedural model of democratic rights, the sovereignty of the individual is diminished. So it seems that Brettschneider and Fiona have similar worries that a procedural attitude toward rights can lead to a tarnished individual freedom. To mitigate this problem Brettschneider asserts “the addressee of the law has rights guaranteeing that the law will not undermine her sovereign status” (34).

In his essay on democratic rights, Brettschneider establishes a value theory of democracy in which democratic ideals serve as guidance for the legitimacy of a democracy itself. Among these values, he writes, is an equality of interests. As Grace previously mentioned, the inordinate wealth of a minority can be used to influence the political process; action which would be seen as illegitimate under his theory. However, he also argues that his conception of democracy will protect the rights commonly associated with democracies, including freedom of speech. His theory, however, cannot reconcile the right to freedom of speech with equality of interests, if some people will be able to have more "speech" than others. It would seem that under his theory, freedom of speech would be thrown out whenever it can't be reconciled with his three principles, because they are more fundamental. In contrast, a theory of justice, like that proposed by Rawls (whom he dismisses because he doesn't want to defend the inherent worth of all humans), is able to weigh the costs and benefits to society associated with a tough choice between ideal democracy and freedom of speech, because it is concerned with a just society more broadly. I'm deeply concerned that Brettschneider's theory doesn't provide the protection he thinks it does for rights I see as fundamental, leaving open the possibility they will be unduly and unintentionally sacrificed. (Note: I don't necessarily see the case I presented as one in which free speech rights override concerns about the damage to the democratic procedure, but do view it as a case where Brettschneider's theory doesn't adequately address free speech concerns.)

Brettschneider seems to be addressing the concerns brought up near the end of seminar last week. If a majority decides to enact a law you disagree with, are you being used as a means (or disrespected as an individual), by being obligated to adhere to it? In a sense, he is arguing for what democracy needs so that it does not become tyrannical. He believes that by incorporating his three core values, we avoid the issues of solely substantive or solely procedural theories, and are able to examine the justification and limits of legitimate coercion in political society (22). He says, "The idea that citizens should be given reasons for coercion, which I see as implicit in the institution of the rule of law, forms the basis of the core value of reciprocity. Treating citizens as sovereign requires not only that they enjoy procedural rights of participation in lawmaking, but also that the government's actions can be reasonably justified to them, especially when the citizens in question are those most affected by the coercion" (43). His method is "bottom-up and top down," accounting for "rule of the people, by the people, and for the people."

Do you think that the three values, taken together, are strong enough to guard against unjust coercion by the state? Brettschneider believes that by using reciprocity to "appeal to citizens' common values of autonomy and equality to discern the limits of coercion," we will have an ideal democracy in which all outcomes can be accepted. However, I wonder, how can you guarantee that all reasonable persons will accept coercion, even under these circumstances? If a person "discerns" that the coercion is unjust, but all three values were in place, what is to be done? If Brettschneider is arguing that this situation is inherently impossible under his theory, then I may need more convincing. I struggle to see how, without imposing conceptions of justice, we will arrive at this happy medium.

I suppose it makes sense, but ...

I don't know whether it's odd for me think this way – or of it's just a show of hilarious sophomoric arrogance – but it seems to me that Brettschneider's understanding of democracy doesn't seem all that revolutionary.

A lot of it just seems to be a play of semantics, mainly what we take democracy to mean. I just feel that if we took Habermas' proceduralist theory and simply shifted the goal posts, the definition of democracy, more generally beyond that of simply democratic procedure (as process) to that of democracy as an institution, we'd get something remarkably similar to the value theory of democracy. I suppose Brettscheneider does a great job of articulating the key values of a democracy, but what does he do that Habermas doesn't? It seems to me that reciprocity is the most interesting of his three values (also, very Rawlsian) but it borrows heavily from Habermas. Just how inventive or innovative an approach was his value theory really? I must say I'm dubious.

Epistemic Theories

Brettschneider addresses "epistemic theories" on page 19 and 20. He argues that proponents of such theories have to show that their standards are more fundamental than democracy. He also says, "the ideal of democracy, I argue, is self rule, and subordination of democratic institutions to one particular comprehensive view would impose external rule on citizens who, reasonably, did not share that view."(20) Kant's views on human nature, for example, seem more f'undamental' than politics, and Brettschneider's democracy constrains self rule similar to how human nature constrains legitimate action in Kant. So Brettschneider really has little argument except to assert that by definition in a democracy, self rule has no constraint except those laid out in his value theory. Thoughts?

 Also im not exactly certain of what he means by "epistemic theories," but he mentions kantian theories.(20)

Problems with the three core values of democracy

Brettschneider argues against the idea that individual rights conflict with democracy. He says, “The problem of constraint is how to reconcile external constraints on democratic procedures with the belief that democracy is the fundamental basis for legitimate polities.” He goes on to explain that he will lay out a theory that can explain why an ideal democracy would protect substantive individual rights and include both procedural guarantees and basic rights.

The three core values of democracy that Brettschneider introduces are equality of interests, political autonomy, and reciprocity. Although his argument can be understood in a theoretical way, it is difficult to imagine how, for example, we will ensure a system of equality of interests. He writes that the equality of interests “requires that all reasonable interests of citizens be respected as having equal weight” (23).  Brettschneider advocates for a government in which one person represents one vote, nothing less and nothing more. However, one’s involvement in one’s local community or knowledge of issues that matter in one’s community might lead to an unequal weight of interests. This is one question that Brettschneider would have to answer – should the people who are disengaged and do not wish to take any part in civic duty still have their interests represented? If so, how do we ensure that their interests are represented equally among others if they are not voicing any of their opinions?   

Additionally, the value of equality of interests in democracy can sound good in theory, however it is not the case for today’s government. The more money you have, the more power and influence you can have on government. The poorer you are, the less time and energy you have to participate in voting, volunteering, and advocating for what you believe in.  Although we agree that humans have equal value and should have equal representation of interests, it is difficult in actuality.

There is also a problem that rises with political autonomy, Brettschneider’s second core value of democracy. Political autonomy, as defined by Brettschneider, “entails the treatment of citizens as individual rulers in a society characterized by collective self-rule” (24). This seems problematic. It is easy to imagine, however, that treating individuals as rulers can lead to various issues and conflicts between individual interests.

Reciprocity and Subjectivity

One of Brettschneider's core values is reciprocity, which "is the notion that policies governing citizens' treatment must be defensible by appeal to arguments that reasonable citizens can accept" (25). Brettschneider says reciprocity can be understood by finding a standard dictated by "an inquiry into what types of coercion are justifiable to citizens in virtue of their sovereign status" (35). He proposes Rawls's principle of reciprocity as an example of how to understand reasonable interaction and coercion. Reasonable treatment, or reciprocity, "can be incorporated into the value theory as a procedure-independent standard for thinking about the rights of addressees" (35). However, Brettschneider also mentions that his value theory of democracy is superior to other theories because it does not require one specific conception of the good (19). He says that "In any society, citizens have an abundance of reasonable beliefs about what truth is, or indeed about whether there is such a thing as truth. Conceptions of justice are similarly wide-ranging. . . The ideal of democracy, I argue, is self-rule, and subordinating democratic institutions to one particular comprehensive view would impose external rule on citizens who, reasonably, did not share that view" (19). Though Brettschneider makes the case that his theory requires no specific conception of what the good is, and only requires that all citizens are given the status of self-rulers and have their equality, political autonomy, and reciprocity respected, won't people have conflicting ideas of what reciprocity will look like in laws? How does Brettschneider propose to deal with the problem that will arise when certain individuals (self-rulers) think that the imposition of a law is reasonable, and they accept its justification, but another group of individuals (also self-rulers) do not find a law reasonable, and hold that they cannot reasonably accept its justification and imposition? Or does Brettschneider think there is an objective standard of "reasonableness" that all people should accept, even if they don't?

The way Brettschneider sees it, democratic theory has been stuck between a rock and a hard place.  Say that we believe, as most advocates of democracy do, that "democracy is the fundamental basis for legitimate polities." [8] Proceduralists about democracy certainly endorse this claim, but then confront an embarrassing problem, that democratic procedures can result in repugnant outcomes.  What if the majority votes to strip some minority of their free speech rights, or their right to vote?  What if the majority votes to do away with democracy?  Have these seemingly illegitimate outcomes thus been legitimated?  Embarrassing.  Others appeal to substantive individual rights [8] to resolve this problem.  If democratic procedures lead to outcomes that violate substantive rights, then they are not legitimate (e.g. are voided).  But this introduces what Brettschneider characterizes as the "problem of constraint": "How to reconcile external constraints on democratic procedures with the belief that democracy is the fundamental basis for legitimate politics." [8]  What legitimates these constraints that are independent of democracy?  What are they, and who interprets them?  Doesn't the appeal to such constraints on democracy invariably have anti-democratic implications?  Many of those who appeal to such substantive rights that are independent of democracy view democracy as merely the most useful means to enforce and safeguard such rights.  But this is an empirical claim, and seems to allow that if we found a more effective way of safeguarding substantive rights, it would then be appropriate to do away with democracy entirely.  Brettschneider believes that there is a path between this rock of proceduralism and the hard place of independent rights that constrain democracy, and argues for it in the excerpt we are discussing on tomorrow.  His path, the value theory of democracy, avoids the shortcomings of purely procedural approaches, while also avoiding the problem of constraint.  What this view is, and how he thinks it preserves the strengths of each approach while avoiding their weaknesses, is something that we want to talk about tomorrow.  See you then! 

Comment to XY

The blog will only let me publish this as a post for some reason, but it's just a comment in response to XY's most recent comment on Grace's post. Sorry for being so technologically challenged and taking up a post with this!

XY,

I think that Ripstein actually says something different about free speech; on p. 264 he says that "the Kantian analysis also explains the familiar idea that public speech is largely exempt from the police power, even when people find the speech inconvenient or troubling." I guess whether or not inflammatory speech is allowed depends partly on your definition of "inflammatory," but for the most part, I think that public speech--both pleasant and unpleasant--is allowed under Ripstein/Kant's view. Ripstein actually goes on to say that the ability of to exercise free public speech is so important because it functions as a tool "through which the state can bring itself more nearly into conformity with the concepts of right in a way that is not itself inconsistent with those concepts" (264). There might be an instance when public speech was so inflammatory that it infringed on others' freedoms, and in that case, I agree that it might not be allowed. But otherwise, public speech does not seem like it can be regulated apart from "neutral limits on time, place, and manner" (264).

I agree that extreme religious actions that infringe on other people's independence/lives would be banned under Kant's view, as would dangerous drugs that led people to hurt/kill others. However, I think it would be difficult to make a case for banning recreational drugs, as it's harder to see how recreational drug use infringes on other people's right to themselves and their property.

KANTradiction?

Ripstein contrasts Kant's non-determinate based theory with that of the Lockean/deontologist or utilitarian/egalitarian who is focused on outcomes. Public legal rules and institutions in a non-Kantian philosophy are justified by their ability to lead society toward predetermined moral/good-maximizing/etc outcomes. "The question," Ripstein writes, "of what results the state should aim to produce is prior to any question about the most effective means of producing it" (9). Kant rejects this framework, arguing instead that legal institutions are not justified because of outcomes but instead necessary because of the need to preserve "each person's entitlement to be his or her own master...consistent with the entitlement of others" (9). Thus, Kant claims supremacy over the other philosophers, because their philosophies are reliant upon the idea that "any particular situation is fully determinate" (9). I see his point when considering philosophers rooted entirely in public outcomes, eg: we need government to ensure equality of income distribution. However, his justification for government (public laws) is also rooted in an outcome, the preservation of each person's entitlement to be their own master. How is this superior to Locke's justification of civil society for the preservation of property (life, liberty and estate)? Kant may argue his theory of true freedom, in his case independence, is better than that put forth by Locke, but Ripstein/Kant seem to confuse philosophers with those implementing their ideas. There is fair criticism to leveled against Lockeans here, but it seems contradictory to criticize Locke himself.

Freedom and Public Interest

In chapter 8, Ripstein discusses that for there to be a "regime of equal private freedom," there must be a system in which a state can compel its citizens to do their part in creating and maintaing this condition. As Professor Hurley mentioned, Ripstein makes the case that private property without public roads takes away an individual's liberty to access the property. Public services, such as access to public roads, ensure people's individual rights and liberties. Ripstein writes that "the state is entitled to make people contribute, both positively and negatively, to their provision, and to regulate them based on a variety of considerations" (238). He is careful to say that this does not mean that the state can autonomously use force to get the cooperation of people. He writes that this mandatory cooperation does not require the assumption "about the state having any more general power to make life convenient" (238). The problem that comes up then is how to define "general power" and where to draw the line between the state acting on behalf of the people to ensure individual liberty, such as the right to property, and the state taking away an individual's liberty for the sake of the public interest. People disagree on whether the government should set strict rules regarding curfew or legalize the use of recreational drugs. One can make the case that both these examples limit an individual's freedom; however they can also be used to argue that the state is acting to protect the interests of the public.

 Although I agree that public authority that can mandate public cooperation through police power is necessary for exercise of other important rights, it is difficult for a state to fairly discern, in a society of people with diverse backgrounds and beliefs, to set laws to protect the interests of the general public  and to ensure that peoples' individual freedoms are not restricted through these laws. Examples that come to mind include the freedom of speech and and religion. We can all agree that these two freedoms should be guaranteed to people. However, at what point should the state intervene to restrict these freedoms on the grounds that it is taking away the freedoms of others ?

One of the cool things about Kant, on Ripstein's reading, is that he is offering a completely different account of the relationship between public right and private right.  As Fiona points out in her draft post, Kant takes freedom to be independence: each person is entitled "to be his or her own master," [4] rather "than the servant of another." [5]  Freedom as independence accounts for the innate private right that each of us has to our own body, and it accounts for why each of us requires a property in things beyond our body, i.e. a private right to land, etc.  But problems of assurance, indeterminacy, and unilateral judgment stand in the way of such legitimate private right to legitimate private property in things beyond our body without the establishment of public powers that can solve these problems of assurance, indeterminacy, and unilateral judgment, in the process paving the way for private right.  In other words, public power is a condition of the extension of private right from our bodies to things and to land.  Notice the subtle but profound shift from Locke and Nozick.  It is not that we have private property, and need the state to protect it; it is that the state (public power) is necessary to establish the conditions of equal individual freedom that are necessary to legitimately acquire rights to private property in things and land.  On this view, you CAN'T have private rights to things and land without the public power of the state.

The chapter 8 argument can be understood as making this point about a specific public power, the power to create, operate, and maintain public roads.  Ripstein is making the case that without public roads maintained by a public authority via public taxation, we cannot have legitimate private property in land.  Private right to land without public roads will violate the conditions of equal individual freedom, hence will be illegitimate.  Putting the point another way, a libertarian account of property fundamentally violates individual liberty -- quite the ironic outcome!  Views about taxes, about when the state can legitimately mandate the cooperation of its citizens, about obligations to the poor, etc., all follow from this fundamental relationship between public and private -- that legitimate public authority is necessary for the the exercise of private right.

Looking forward to tomorrow!
 

Kantian Independence

I found the description of Kantian independence interesting, especially because I think seems to be a contradictory element. Independence comes from the distinction between person and thing, as "a person is a being capable of setting his or her own purpose, while a thing is something that can be used in pursuit of purposes" (14). Ripstein goes on to say, "you are independent if you are the one who decides which purposes you will pursue" (14). This idea of independence is basically that you are independent when you make all the choices for your body and nobody else makes decisions for you. Dependence is when another "person gets to decide what purposes you will pursue" (15). I find all of this convincing and an interesting take on independence, as there is a distinction between autonomy and independence. I found it contradictory that Ripstein explains autonomy as something stand alone, but says that independence can only be understood in relation to dependence. He writes that, "Kantian independence is not a feature of the individual person considered in isolation, but of relations of persons" (15). I understand how independence is the counterexample to dependence, but I still feel like somebody could be independent stranded on a desert island and totally alone. That individual would be independent, as she is only subject to her own choices. I do not know if I am totally convinced that independence can only be understood relationally. I agree with the concept of independence as meaning an individual is in charge of her own choices and can only be thought of as an ends, but I feel like this could also apply to a person in isolation.

NYT OP on Rawls v.s. Nozick

Came across this article about Rawls' "social liberalism" v.s. Nozick's "laissez-faire liberalism" by Amia Srvinivasan. I loved it. It's very thoughtful material that'll probably help those doing the Chamberlain paper.

As someone who's for distributive justices, I am more than a little piqued by Nozick's arguments. I thought Srinivasan made a lot of sense. She says someone pro-Nozick must be able to give unequivocal postive responses to the following four questions:

1.  Is any exchange between two people in the absence of direct physical compulsion by one party against the other (or the threat thereof) necessarily free?
2. Is any free (not physically compelled) exchange morally permissible?
3. Do people deserve all they are able, and only what they are able, to get through free exchange?
4. Are people under no obligation to do anything they don’t freely want to do or freely commit themselves to doing?

It's a short read, highly enourage yous to leaf through it.

Concepts and Conceptions

In the first chapter, Rawls explains the difference between a concept and conception of justice. He writes, “the concept of justice I take to be defined, then, by the role of principles in assigning rights and duties and in defining the appropriate division of social advantages. A conception of justice is an interpretation of this role” (Rawls, 9). If conception is the interpretation of concept, is it possible to have a just concept, but an unjust conception? 

To examining the idea of opposing conception and concept of justice, let’s imagine that the pairing of conception and concept is relevantly similar to a house and its blueprint: a house is an interpretation of a blueprint in the same way a conception is an interpretation of a concept. It is possible that a house’s blueprint seems structurally sound, but the house itself, once build, is unstable. Maybe, in similar way, the concept is just, but the conception, or the concept’s interpretation, is unjust. The best example I think of this might be dichotomy between the declaring all men are created equal and then denying Black Americans the right to vote, among many other things. It is just to profess, as rule of distributing rights and duties, that everyone is entitled to the same rights. But somehow that conception of justice was lost in interpretation when it came to giving Blacks the right to vote. If it’s possible to have a just concept and an unjust conception, how can the just concept some how lost in interpretation?

Rawls and Rational Choice

I think it’s important to note the different reasons Locke, Hobbes, and Rawls give for entering society (or for Rawls, having a certain system), while understanding their common driver – rational choice. For Hobbes, the goal of the system is self-preservation, so people enter society in order to preserve themselves. This is an idea of rational choice at its most basic, where a decision is made for a person’s survival. For Locke, he is concerned about property, but broadly defined to include “life, liberty, and estate.” People enter society in order to protect their rights and prevent the chaos that occurs in the absence of a common authority. In both cases, society occurs because it is in the greater interest for those individual people, as they are situated, to enter into society.

Rawls, when applying his ideas of the original position and the veil of ignorance, also uses rational choice. As he notes, there “are principles that free and rational persons concerned to further their own interests would accept in an initial position of equality as defining the fundamental terms of their association.” (10). By decontextualizing people from the environment where they make their decisions, however, he subtly changes the idea of rational choice. Under Hobbes and Locke, it seems to coalesce around the individual and what is good for him, but with Rawls it becomes about the community. As he puts it, “principles of justice [chosen by rational persons] deal with conflicting claims upon the advantages won by social cooperation; they apply to the relations among several persons or groups.” (15). In a certain way, Rawls is using rational choice to correct for the excesses that can result from rational choice (unequal distribution, capture of the state by certain interests/classes, etc.). Moreover, he is expanding a circle, previously focused on just the individual, to draw an eye toward society. In that way, his idea of justice is fundamentally different than that of Locke especially. Locke is concerned in the sense that they safeguard the individual and his rights, as is Rawls. The next step is expanding the idea of rational choice to include the community as well. Nevertheless, this seems to raise questions over the scope of rational choice, if there are any, and the effects of rational choice on Rawls’s theory.

Rawls on Equality and Justice/ Justice vs. Law of Nature

Rawls asserts that justice does not arise "from an original agreement in a situation of equality" (p.13). Rather, justice must be established first, as it "is the first virtue of social institutions" (3).  He uses the principle of utility to support his point and argues that this principle will not stand if there is only the understanding of equality and not justice, due to human selfishness. If there was no sense of justice in a society in which people viewed themselves as equals, it is hard to imagine people agreeing "to a principle which may require lesser life prospects for some simply for the sake of a greater sum of advantages for others" (13). An individual will act to protect only his interests without the understanding of justice. Therefore, "in the absence of strong and lasting benevolent impulses, a rational man would not accept a basic structure merely because it maximized the algebraic sum of advantages irrespective of its permanent effects on his own basic rights and interests." The principle of utility cannot operate in a society of equals that only look out for their own interests and cannot work toward a mutual advantage. 

Locke, on the other hand, uses the law of nature to introduce justice. The law teaches that "no one ought to harm another in his life, health, or possessions." Although Locke does not directly introduce the idea of justice, there is a sense of fairness and respect between human relationships that is established through his law of nature. One can argue, however, that someone could get away with an act that is unjust but does not violate the law of nature. The law of nature prohibits the harming of another person's life or possessions. The idea of justice, as introduced by Rawls, goes further to use it to explain social relationships in which individuals must be mindful of the common good or the interests of the general public. For example, a man might hoard available land at the expense of his neighbor. However, since the man did not steal from his neighbor or harm him to get the land, this act does not go against Locke's law of nature. Rawls, however, may assert that the man is not upholding justice by hoarding the land because it goes against the idea of justice as fairness. 

Two things I’d like to talk about in this blog post: (in)equality and the different definitions of justice from Hobbes through to Rawls.

I’m a soc major who’s always been very interested in socio-economic inequality, so I was pretty excited to read what Rawls had to say on this. I find liberal equality very intuitively appealing — it is most fair, after all; arbitrariness of birth and favor really gets to me — but I’d be silly to ignore the arguments against it. Rawls puts up a very convincing case against it (the fight for equality never ends, can never end.) For those of you who were at the Ath talk this Monday, there was another case against liberal equality (however polemic): that efforts (affirmative action, say) spent towards that end could even be pareto sub-optimal. 

Rawls doesn’t hold that strict liberal interpretation of equality. His idea of equality depends on what he calls the difference principle. My reading of what he says: inequality is okay as long as the difference principle is obeyed, which says that the actions/policies that benefit the favored in society are acceptable as long as the least-favored benefit in some way from it. The chain connection is a transmission mechanism in this process: if the least-favored benefit, then those adjacent to them on the socio-economic ladder will benefit slightly as well (magnitude depends on close-knittedness.) [How well do I represent Rawls’ here? Feel free to come at this if I’m off-base!]

Francesca mentioned Hobbes, Locke et al in reference to Rawls, and I thought it’d be cool to see the different way Rawls handles justice compared to the British pair. Rawls’ conception of justice as a virtue, as something that with a moral core, is much closer to our contemporary (and my personal intuitive understanding) of justice in my opinion. Hobbes and Locke only consider it within the institution of society — this Rawls calls formal justice. Rawls begins with justice as a first principle: society, which itself is a gestalt of institutions, can be judged as just or unjust. I find this to be a lot more relatable an understanding, anyone else feel the same way?

Something to keep an eye out for.  Many interpreters of Rawls believe that the core argument for his two principles does not appear where he says that it does, in the middle sections of chapter 3, but in secs. 11-13 of chapter 2 (particularly in sec. 12).  Others believe that the core argument for his two principles appears in a late section of chapter 3, sec. 29.  We will be focusing on the sec. 29 argument for tutorial, but it is very helpful, both for that paper and for understanding Rawls, to focus on the secs. 11-13 (particularly sec. 12) argument as well.  See you tomorrow for class at 1:15 at The Press!

Equality, justice and liberty (and all of their meanings)

Each of the authors we have read thus far (Hobbes, Locke, Marx, and now Rawls) each have a unique understanding of these ideas of equality, justice and liberty. According to Hobbes, individuals are equal in the state of nature because they are able to freely compete and preserve themselves through any means. Liberty similarly exists in the natural absence of impediment on one's freedom fulfill their needs. Justice, on the other hand, can only exist under the social contract and therefore pushing individuals into join society. 

In comparison, Locke understands equality as a result of no one having power over another. There are two types of liberty for Locke: natural and social, the first pertaining to only being ruled by the laws of nature and the second to be free from rule under any government except that founded by the consent of the commonwealth. The government resulting from the social contract upholds justice, which to Locke, means protecting personal property and liberty. Marx is of course, far more critical of the ideas of equality, justice and liberty, understanding each as a false promise under the capitalist state and only truly existing under communism.

Rawls, in his A Theory of Justice, again discusses these three ideas. Unlike the others, Rawls believes both equality and liberty are the result of the state of justice. His principle of justice as fairness results from individuals beginning in the "original position" in which they can decide (without any subjective ideas) what is just and what is not. This ultimately results in a society that guarantees basic liberties (compatible with liberties for all others) and only allows social and economic inequalities to exist if to benefit the least advantaged.

All of these concepts (freedom, equality, justice) are in fact the foundation of our American society. Although our notion of these principles do not align exactly with any of these philosophers, each offer an aspect that has been combined into our cultural understanding and how we work to uphold these ideals. 

Locke's Consent vs. Rawls's Voluntary Scheme

In "The Main Idea of the Theory" (p. 12), Rawls offers an account of how people can come to live under the duties and obligations of a society without voluntarily expressing their consent to live in that society. This is a question that both Locke and Smith also discuss; Locke believes that both express and tacit consent explain how a society can legitimately claim power over citizens, while Smith believes that individual consent has nothing to do with how governments maintain power.
Rawls proposes another account of how society can assign obligations and duties to its citizens, which I find to be more convincing than Locke's: "No society can, of course, be a scheme of cooperation which men enter voluntarily in a literal sense; each person finds himself placed at birth in some particular position in some particular society, and the nature of this position materially affects his life prospects. Yet a society satisfying the principles of justice as fairness comes as close as a society can to being a voluntary scheme, for it meets the principles which free and equal persons would assent to under circumstances that are fair. In this sense its members are autonomous and the obligations they recognize self-imposed" (12).  Rawls's account implies that a government is not legitimate simply because citizens enjoy and use the benefits/land belonging to that society, which is a weakness present in Locke's account of tacit consent. Rawls goes a step further than Locke in considering what a "legitimate" government really is: not just one to which people seem to have agreed to by living under it, but one that also conforms to principles of justice that would be considered just by all people in the original position. Other thoughts on how Rawls's interpretation of a "voluntary scheme" compares with Locke's/Smith's lack thereof?