Sympathy

An interesting point that Smith makes in The Theory of Moral Sentiments is regarding people compassion or pity when they see another person in misery. Smith argues that there is a certain disconnection between the specter and the one actually in misery. He writes, "But the poor wretch, who is in it, laughs and sings perhaps, and is altogether insensible of his own misery. The anguish which humanity feels, therefore, at the sight of such an object, cannot be the reflection of any sentiment of the sufferer" (12).

Smith interestingly argues that the misery and the distress of the person actually experiencing the misfortune will never be as great as the specter's. He uses an example of a mother seeing her infant suffer through a disease. The mother is terrified of her own "helplessness, and her own terrors for the unknown  consequences of its disorders" (12). However, the infant cannot feel any more misery than the present instant.

Smith argues that the compassion we have as specters must only come out of how we ourselves would feel if we were in that situation of misery. We are completely insensitive to what the person is going through in reality and therefore cannot be truly sensitive to that person.

Smith believes that, however, it is not only misery and sadness that we can experience as specters for another but more importantly joy. He writes, "the sympathy, which my friends express with my joy, might indeed, give me pleasure by enliving that joy: but that which they press with my grief could give me none, if it served only to enliven that grief. Sympathy however, enlivens joy and alleviates grief" (14).

Passion of the body and of the imagination

I found Smith's distinction between the passions "which take their origin from the body" and those "which take their origin from a particular turn or habit of the imagination" to be very interesting. Smith claims that passion related to bodily needs are/should be far less sympathized/advertised than passions related to the imagination. He writes that "The true cause of the peculiar disgust which we conceive for the appetites of the body when we see them in other men, is that we cannot enter into them." On the other hand, Smith claims that we sympathize more with intangible occurrences because, "our imaginations can more readily mould themselves upon his imagination, than our bodies can mould themselves upon his body."

I struggle to relate to this idea. It seems almost counterintuitive that we sympathize more with "imagined" grief and happiness than tangible grief and joy. I understand the sentiment of his argument, but feel that I often am more inclined not to sympathize with perceived emotions for the fact that they are formed internally and are not real. Perhaps this is a perverse way of thinking and Smith would claim that I am invirtuous, but to truly adopt the role of a completely impartial spectator in these cases is really, really hard. If you're hungry, I can recall a time when I was hungry and easily relate. (While I agree pain is temporary and we often forget about these experiences much easier than imagined emotional ones, it seems almost irrational. Still, I maintain that in identifying with other's sentiments, it is easier to take the role of the impartial spectator on those that originate from the body). If you're heartbroken over a relationship, I cannot truly understand how you feel as I was not there for all the moments you and your partner shared. (I note that he says we relate to love's secondary emotions, but regardless, find sympathy difficult.) The notion that the bulk of our sympathy arises from imagined feelings is almost unsettling and existential. This point drives home when Smith talks about death: "It is from this very illusion of the imagination, that the foresight of our own dissolution is so terrible to us, and that the idea of those circumstances, which undoubtedly can give us no pain when we are dead, makes us miserable while we are alive." While he thinks this "dread of death--the great poison of happiness" is necessary to protect society, it is interesting to think about the monopolizing effects imagination can hold on us.

I also think this idea is dependent upon the society you are in. Many cultures do not place emphasis on expressing "imagined emotions" while others dictate the opposite. In primitive societies, I would imagine basic human bodily needs were the primary things discussed. In modern Western societies, we see the emergence of the emphasis on emotional connectivity. Do you think this idea is dependent on political structures, social factors, material luxuries, etc?

SMITH

In Part I Chapter III Smith says, "When the original passions of the person principally concerned are in perfect concord with the sympathetic emotions of the spectator, they necessarily appear to this last just and proper, and suitable to their objects."(page 11 in my different version)

Then in Chapter V he writes "when we are determining the degree of blame or applause which seems due to any action, we very frequently make use of two different standards. The first is the idea of complete propriety."(21) The second is level of propriety expected of most men.

It seems to me that these two standards could be appropriate for judging passions as well. I do not necessarily approve or deem just another's passions simply because I share them. I often experience feelings that I condemn or realize are inappropriate. Smith's 'position of the impartial spectator' seems intended to produce these sorts of realizations. But awareness of a feeling's impropriety does not always dispel it.

Reason and Passion

I think it's interesting to note the way that Smith combines reason with passion in Moral Sentiments. I think other political philosophers--Hobbes, for example--tend to think of reason and passion as two distinct, and sometimes competing, entities. Smith, however, seems to be giving an account of how passions affect our reason, and how our reason tells us to interpret other people's passions and portray our own. The way we reason--our "imagination," and how we judge the reasonableness of one's emotions--affects our "fellow-feeling" that we're able to extend to others. At first it seems somewhat uncompassionate to give reason such a large role in determining how we interpret other people's emotions, but I think Smith is actually proposing a more advanced way to look at the person, since reason and passion do get intertwined/affect each other in the way we interact with other people. I think reason and passion are still separate in some ways for Smith; for example, the person who gets angry when provoked will likely get angry without reasoning about whether that anger is justifiable. However, from the impartial spectator's view, reason will play a large part in determining whether one's anger is justified, and whether other people will sympathize with that anger.

A start on Smith and virtue...

I find Smith's idea of human virtue very interesting, especially because it seems to contradict with his general image of the self-interested economist. Smith discusses two sets of virtues, "the soft, the gentle, the amiable virtues, the virtues of candid condescension and indulgent humanity," and "the great, the awful, and the respectable, the virtues of self-denial, of self-government..." (19) I find these two sets interesting, as they are clearly opposites and in his initial description Smith points out seemingly problematic qualities of each of the sets. Indeed, it is easy to think about how something like loyalty might be a virtue, but at the same time loyalty without prudence seems to be a vice. Smith brings up this point that the extremes of either of the two types of virtues are bad, rather an individual must be balanced in order to be virtuous. "Virtue is excellence," meaning that people must go beyond the expected and easy to be virtuous (20). Virtue means a balance between the amiable and the great. Smith says that "to feel much for others, and little for ourselves, that to restrain our selfish, and to indulge our benevolent, affections, constitutes the perfection of human nature," as people must be amiable but must also possess self-command (20). I think this view of virtue is pretty convincing, as he goes above and beyond mere propriety to a greater sense of virtue.

Smith's "impartialness"

Smith's account of moral sentimentalism in The Theory of Moral Sentiments rests largely in his understanding of sympathy, a human emotion that arises when we imagine how we would feel in the same situation as someone else is experiencing. The correct type of sympathy, or morally superior type according to Smith, is the feeling an “impartial spectator” would have towards the individual in the given situation. This is important to Smith’s moral account because having sympathy for another is essentially to approve of the individual's reaction to a situation.

Thus the "impartial spectator" plays a large role in Smith's account, as this individual is supposed to respond as one would if following “moral norms.” The problem is that this displayal of such norms becomes Smith’s account for what is moral; however, as we know, existing as a societal institution does not equate being inherently moral (or just, or righteous, etc). Indeed it is obvious that Smith’s spectator reflects time-specific societal norms, but it is concerning how Smith takes these norms (sympathizing with the rich, looking down upon the poor) to be inherent to human conception of understanding one another. How well we sympathize with another person is entirely dependent on our own personal experiences; Smith would not deny that we can most easily feel whatever another is feeling if we have had a similar experience in our lifetime, but he focuses not enough on how these variances should have an equal influence on the spectator’s decisions. 

Overall, Smith also fails to focus on an innate (and extremely valuable) human feeling of compassion, perhaps the most important type of sympathy of all. Instead, Smith’s account glorifies the wealthy and powerful while assume that the poor lives shameful lives with limited senses of self-worth.

Living like a Kantian

I thought you all might enjoy this article, written by Ryan Park, a former clerk to Justice Ruth Bader Ginsberg. Park details the birth of his daughter and a transition from clerking to homemaking back to practicing law. He writes about how his wife took time off from medical school to support him during his clerkship, then he did the same to support her during her residency.

It was in this spirit that I decided to take a short break from my career and experience life as a stay-at-home dad. My wife, without really even considering doing otherwise, had already taken almost a year off from medical school after Caitlyn was born, partly to support me during a challenging clerkship, and partly because she believed it would be good for Caitlyn’s development. But mostly it was for my wife herself. She valued motherhood and wanted to experience it fully, for as long as she could without jeopardizing her professional goals. I felt exactly the same way. My deepest fear is that, decades from now, I will look back at the heart of my life and realize I made the wrong choices in favor of work.

 The passage above also illustrates the importance Park places on spending time with his daughter. In more ways than one, I immediately connected Park's life choices with those advocated by Hampton. The relationship he has with his wife is one in which equal "sacrifices" (although he would probably contend that taking time off was not a sacrifice) are taken by both parties within their marriage. It is also one in which the relationship with his daughter is certainly one in which he takes care of her, but he gets just as much, if not more, out of the relationship. Nothing earth-shattering here, but I thought it was a nice illustration of something along the lines of Hampton's philosophy in practice.