In Part I Chapter III Smith says, "When the original passions of the person principally concerned are in perfect concord with the sympathetic emotions of the spectator, they necessarily appear to this last just and proper, and suitable to their objects."(page 11 in my different version)
Then in Chapter V he writes "when we are determining the degree of blame or applause which seems due to any action, we very frequently make use of two different standards. The first is the idea of complete propriety."(21) The second is level of propriety expected of most men.
It seems to me that these two standards could be appropriate for judging passions as well. I do not necessarily approve or deem just another's passions simply because I share them. I often experience feelings that I condemn or realize are inappropriate. Smith's 'position of the impartial spectator' seems intended to produce these sorts of realizations. But awareness of a feeling's impropriety does not always dispel it.
I think you're mistaken. The justness and propriety Smith is referring to in your first quote isn't any sort of universal value, it's just the perception of the person principally concerned (PPC). When you, the spectator, share his passions it appears to him, the PPC, that you hold "just and proper sentiments."
ReplyDeleteOr at least that's how I parse the sentence.