Wednesday, February 25, 2015

Problems with the three core values of democracy

Brettschneider argues against the idea that individual rights conflict with democracy. He says, “The problem of constraint is how to reconcile external constraints on democratic procedures with the belief that democracy is the fundamental basis for legitimate polities.” He goes on to explain that he will lay out a theory that can explain why an ideal democracy would protect substantive individual rights and include both procedural guarantees and basic rights.

The three core values of democracy that Brettschneider introduces are equality of interests, political autonomy, and reciprocity. Although his argument can be understood in a theoretical way, it is difficult to imagine how, for example, we will ensure a system of equality of interests. He writes that the equality of interests “requires that all reasonable interests of citizens be respected as having equal weight” (23).  Brettschneider advocates for a government in which one person represents one vote, nothing less and nothing more. However, one’s involvement in one’s local community or knowledge of issues that matter in one’s community might lead to an unequal weight of interests. This is one question that Brettschneider would have to answer – should the people who are disengaged and do not wish to take any part in civic duty still have their interests represented? If so, how do we ensure that their interests are represented equally among others if they are not voicing any of their opinions?   

Additionally, the value of equality of interests in democracy can sound good in theory, however it is not the case for today’s government. The more money you have, the more power and influence you can have on government. The poorer you are, the less time and energy you have to participate in voting, volunteering, and advocating for what you believe in.  Although we agree that humans have equal value and should have equal representation of interests, it is difficult in actuality.


There is also a problem that rises with political autonomy, Brettschneider’s second core value of democracy. Political autonomy, as defined by Brettschneider, “entails the treatment of citizens as individual rulers in a society characterized by collective self-rule” (24). This seems problematic. It is easy to imagine, however, that treating individuals as rulers can lead to various issues and conflicts between individual interests.

1 comment:

  1. I think to effectively understand his theory we have to look at the three core values comprehensively and in conjunction with each other. He explicitly says the three values "standing alone, underlie a whole range of political ideals that are not clearly democratic. My aim, however, is to develop a collective understanding of these values that focuses on their specifically democratic meaning" (23).

    Brettschneider addresses the question you brought up regarding people opting out of their civic duty when he criticized the shortcomings of purely procedural view. I think his response is that if you also have political autonomy incorporated into democratic ideals, then we will avoid such an outcome. The idea of avoiding certain outcomes is (as I understand it) exactly why he does not support procedural views.

    In response to the feasibility of equality of interests and political autonomy, once again, I think it is important to consider these in the context of the existence of all three values. He writes, "On my view, mutual or reciprocal justification should appeal to citizens' common values of autonomy and equality to discern the limits of coercion. Reciprocity thus might be referred to as an organizing value because it suggests how to apply the other two core values" (25). Without reciprocity, the two other values will be susceptible to the issues you bring up. If you have reciprocity ("policies governing citizens' treatment must be defensible by appeal to arguments that reasonable citizens can accept"), then you avoid issues inequity of interests because people would not agree to that. This starts to sound Rawlsian, which I believe is what he is getting at (see footnote 36).

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