Chicken and Egg

According to Smith, the type of government determines the type of property we can own. For example, in a shepherding society, intellectual property rights or land rights have no validation. I thought it was interesting how Marx took the same approach to the the role of religion and feasibility of political emancipation. According to Marx, the type of government determines the type of question religion poses (30). In Germany (or a religious state), the Jewish question is "purely theological"and "criticism here is criticism of theology" (30). Therefore, when the Jewish individual faults the Christian state, she is criticizing theology on the whole. In France, the question becomes constitutional. In the states is when the question becomes secular. Here is where Marx claims that Bauer's "criticisms cease to be critical," because religion doesn't need to be eliminated from a society for there to be political emancipation, depending on the government instituted (31).

Marx's view on property, however, doesn't not take a subjective approach, but rather, Marx objectively rejects the notion of private property for the reasons Fiona mentioned. It is interesting to consider, across a variety of issues, what comes first--government or the issue itself (such as property or religion)--and what is the correlation. 

Community and the Individual

Although it may seem that a government brings people into a community, Marx argues that political rights are actually isolate individuals in "On the Jewish Question." He comments that "political rights" can indeed "only be exercised if one is a member of a community," but that does not mean that they bring people together (41). The rights of a citizen are right such as voting, while the rights of man are freedom of religion, property, etc. People use their citizenship rights to secure the rights of mankind, such as the protection of private property. Marx comments that "the right of property is, therefore, the right to enjoy one's fortune and to dispose of it as one will," essentially "the right of self interest" (42). As citizenship rights are used to protect property rights, government is actually used to drive people further apart rather than bring them together. Marx acknowledges the somewhat Lockean idea that "security is the supreme social concept of civil society," as society exists to enforce security, but that security itself is the "assurance of [civil society's] egoism" (43). Society is composed of egoistic individuals, thus society is founded on principles of egoism. In this way, Marx argues that, "political liberators reduce citizenship, the political community, to a mere means for preserving these so-called rights of man [meaning right to property, religion, etc]" (43). Thus, even when a state believes that in its creation it is breaking down barriers between individuals and bringing people into a common society, it is actually just reinforcing the isolation of mankind.

The "three aspects of social activity."[157] in "The German Ideology."

Marx identifies the "first historical act" as "the production of the means to satisfy...needs." [156]  The second "moment" is that "The satisfaction of the first need...leads to new needs," [156] and the third is that human beings are inherently social, in particular that "men...begin to make other men, to propagate their kind." [156]  The suggestion appears to be that, as the inherently social beings that we are, we co-operate to produce what we need, and that, in doing so, we produce new needs, which require more complex forms of co-operation to support more complex and powerful modes of production for their satisfaction, which in turn produces new needs, which require still more complex forms of co-operation to support more complex and powerful modes of production for their satisfaction, which produces new needs, which require even more complex... [see p. 157].  The original social unit is the family or extended family.  It co-operates to produce what it needs, in the process creating new needs. Families join together (into clans or tribes) to facilitate more complex forms of co-operation, with more complex division of labor, to satisfy these new needs, which in turn produces still new needs, which drives them to yet more complex forms of social co-operation to  support yet more complex modes of production to meet these continually increasing needs.  These three "moments," Marx seems to suggest, are the fundamental forces that drive real human history "independently of any political or religious nonsense which would especially hold men together." [157] 

For tomorrow, look for the contrasts between Hobbes' account of power and Locke's account (Par. 3); Hobbes' account of liberty and Locke's account (Par. 6 -- note, for Hobbes liberty IS license!); Hobbes' account of equality and Locke's account (Pars. 4 and 54); Hobbes' account of laws of nature and Locke's account (Par. 6ff); Hobbes' account of Reason/rationality and Locke's account (Par. 6ff); and Hobbes' account of the state of nature and Locke's account (Pars. 16-21).

With the account of property, can you tease out what it is, for Locke, to have a property in something?  What does it mean, for example, to say that we each own ourselves?  What is a commons?  What is the process through which individuals can take something out of a commons and make it their property?  What are the limits on what can be appropriated through this process (the "Lockean Provisos")? What is the theory of the value of property that Locke is relying upon? What role does money play in his account?  Are there problems with any aspects of this account?

Rousseau offers a very explicit argument against Locke's account of the rightful accumulation of property in the state of nature.  What is Rousseau's argument?

Smith offers a strikingly different account of property from Locke's, one which questions whether, in primitive political societies, one can have a rightful property in land at all.  Which aspects of Locke's account is Smith rejecting?

So much to talk about tomorrow! 

It helps to read Hobbes with Locke in mind.  Each utilizes a framework that begins in the state of nature, appeals to laws of nature and rights of nature, appeals to freedom/liberty, appeals to property (propriety), invokes a covenant/contract, and institutes a sovereign.  Yet the accounts are radically different.  For example, for Hobbes the State of Nature is a State of War, there is no property in the state of nature, there are no Lockean rights of nature in the state of nature, and there is no Lockean liberty.  Hobbes's sovereign is necessarily an absolute sovereign; Locke holds that no legitimate sovereign can be absolute.  In working through Hobbes, we want to make sure to prevent the surface similarities from obscuring the profound differences between his account and those put forward later by Locke, Rousseau, and many other social contract theorists.  I am not asking those of you who have not yet read Locke to read ahead, but all of you should be highly attuned to what Hobbes means by Rights, Freedom, etc.  Is it what we mean?  How does it differ?  How do these differences impact the shape of his argument?

The relevant Hobbes excerpt is in the slot on my office door.  See you for seminar on Tuesday!