Goods beget goods and Social Value

While Grace commented on the culture of poverty thesis, I want to also address the "goods beget goods conception" and commend its ability to support Lebron's social value thesis. Last year, in political philosophy we had debates about affirmative action, and one widely acknowledged criticism is that affirmative action should target socioeconomic classes, not race. However, Lebron effectively describes why lack of certain resources is not sufficient to address racial inequality. Viewing race in terms of social value highlights why black individuals of a higher economic status face discriminatory practices as well. The issue of race relations delves far deeper than just the continued cycle of poverty that perpetuates racial inequalities. If institutions continue to enable racism, implicit or explicit, we cannot make progress towards an equal society. 

I would be interested to hear Lebron's views on affirmative action and whether it serves as a tool to remedy the shame we should feel, whether it enhances the agency of black individuals, and whether it is an appropriate practice for institutions to implement. 

Survival and success

"Middle-class whites with easy access to high-quality educational institutions and a social network comprised of similarly advantaged persons tend to think that Americans can be self-made achievers if they try hard enough. In contrast, many inner-city black youths find school one of the least worthwhile places to be. Real effort pays off in earning street respect rather than getting a good grade on a book report. Thus, it is entirely possible to place two representative persons who are nonetheless American and get starkly different outlooks on what is worth doing and how best to do it" (62).

This particular passage stuck out to me for effectively explaining the problem of how black culture is often critiqued; as individuals who not only have our basic needs met but are also predisposed to succeed- with access to top equation and access to numerous professional opportunities, it can be hard to even come to close to understanding the motivations of those who have far less. For many black youths, "succeeding" is not a goal because surviving must be. Many have a number of other stress factors that deter their focus: food, shelter, safety, and any combination of the three. Arguing that living this lifestyle should only be more of a motivation to somehow "try harder" and find a way out of the culture ignorantly neglects the way that struggle engrosses one's whole life. Being able to succeed (especially in upper-class terms) is a luxury- not a predetermined right- and ought to be understood as such.

I know that the idea of success plays a large role in American society and of course, individuals have many deferring opinions on the issue. I would like to explore even further the nature of the term, and how we can best conceive of it. Lebron's account helps to demonstrate how differing cultures (often defined by or at least influenced largely by race) may produce different definitions of the word, and how certain societal circumstances (like his version of implicit institutional injustice) lead individuals to look for success in non-traditional ways, such as criminal activities like drug-dealing or stealing. Although he does not condone nor justify such actions, Lebron successfully emphasizes the importance of understanding the nature of the problem as "historically and socially embedded power" (44).

Rationality of Unfortunate Decisions

Lebron presents Patrick Moynihan’s culture of poverty thesis. The thesis argues that “blacks are the cause of their disproportionate inequality because they have developed a culture that not merely embraces disadvantage but uses it as a wedge to blame society for their ills when in fact, their embrace of disadvantage has perpetrated a culture or shared way of life among blacks that justifies poor social, economic, and political choices” (49). Lebron responds by saying that this argument is ignorant of how disadvantage can deeply affect an individual’s agency and beliefs of his or her life prospects. He goes on to say that unfortunate decisions made by blacks are rational “in the face of radical institutional unfairness” (50). They are also not unethical as the structure of society is fundamentally unjust with regards to race.

I think it is important that conservative thinkers of racial equality and poverty understand Lebron’s arguments. However, I also believe that a middle ground approach is best when addressing this issue in a way that would result in tangible change in the lives of black people. I understand that Lebron defends the rationality of choices of blacks for the sake of trying to help outsiders have a better grasp on how social position influences one’s decisions. However, if all blacks understood their situation as Lebron understands it, would it not perpetuate the cycle of disproportionate inequality without blacks feeling empowered to act upon their circumstances to escape this cycle? Instead perhaps there can be a middle ground approach, one that takes into account obstacles that a group faces due to the problem of social value but also empowers them with the agency to make different choices, that would result in more tangible changes in their lives and more success stories like Lebron’s.

Any other thoughts in this claim that Lebron makes? It seems like it is quite a bold statement that is worth unpacking and for further discussion. 

Aspiration in Lebron and Beitz

This topic is more specific to chapter 1, but I don't think we touched on it too much (though a little in Tyler's/Tim's blog posts), and I think it's also still relevant to chapter 2/the book in general. I wanted to compare the "aspirational" aspect of shame for Lebron and the "aspirational" nature of human rights for Beitz. Lebron describes shame as serving an aspirational purpose: "Because we think justice is something we can do rather than receive as a result of fortune, it also indicates our common aspiration to be better, more good, and more upstanding. To the extent that we can fall short of these ambitions on account of error or confusion, and to the extent that shame can be instrumental in setting us straight, we should conceive of shame as something more than a means of criticism or prompting feelings of failure or guilt. Shame on this view can support our best aspirations in a manner beyond helping make our vision for a better way clearer; indeed, it can help bring our deliberations and actions into coherence with our prior affirmed ideals" (25). Beitz includes the idea of aspiration when saying that human rights are a practice and not a regime. Beitz says that "the idea of a regime focuses attention on explicit rules and formal procedures for their application. To some extent these elements are present for human rights, but an exclusive focus on them would fail to embrace the ways in which human rights function as standards of aspiration--for example, as bases of political criticism, elements of a shared moral language, and ideals that guide efforts at political change by individuals and nongovernmental organizations. . . . [Human rights] operate as goals of political change for nongovernmental actors and as a global analog of the public conception of justice found in well-ordered domestic societies (44).

I think it's interesting to see Lebron's aspirational account of shame in comparison with Beitz's aspirational account of human rights. Lebron, I think, does a better job of explaining why "aspiration" really is the right word to attach to how shame affects us; because shame comes as a result of a gap between our ideals and our actions, in particular, the social value we place on black lives, there is a clear distinction between where we are and where we aspire to be. Since Beitz's account is so empirical, though, I don't think it makes as much sense to attach "aspirational" to his account of human rights. True, we all aspire to respect and protect human rights, but Beitz's account does not do a particularly in-depth job of exactly what we should be aspiring to. Keeping in mind the supposedly "aspirational" nature of Beitz's human rights while reading Lebron (both chapters 1 and 2) has helped me see why Lebron's account of shame actually is aspirational. It also, as has been mentioned by a lot of other people in blog posts/class, is nice to have an account that, in being aspirational, actually shows us one way that we might be able to achieve what we aspire to.

Shame and Hope

I think its interesting that shame and hope, two emotions that seem antithetical, both play into Lebron's writing. He uses shame as a tool for improving American society; shame is a necessary step on the path away from racism within ourselves and our institutions. In order to remake our national character, the white citizens of America must first feel profound shame for the systemic racism that pervades society (whether willful or unconscious). Shame, as an emotion, lingers for a long time, never really going away. The shame you feel because you have wronged someone will often leave you to conclude you must rectify your mistake, although the nature of shame is such that you will never totally be able to make up for your wrongs. Yet, within shame, and within Lebron's writings, is a sense of hope about what can come after shame. One quote from Lebron highlighted this sense of hope, so I'll include it here: "To be a disadvantaged agent is not the same as being a determined agent. We retain the capacity to be better selves than we are. This is the value of mobilizing the idea of shame..." (13). This is far different picture than many political scientists paint because it includes a a sense of agency. Despite the systemic nature of racism, we as individuals can choose to understand the nature of the problem before us and feel shame that it still exists. While institutions are vital to eliminating racism, Lebron's argument vests power in the individual to work through the shame to become a better self, ultimately helping to reduce or eliminate systemic racism.

Timeless Ideas

Something of an open question on this, but I'm not quite understanding how Lebron can reject the process of moral reasoning to attain timeless principles, while simultaneously accepting other timeless principles, namely those he believes shame refers to. Lebron seems to set his argument in an attempt to establish a nonideal. In his words, his "aim is tot take the problem in view on its own terms and respond to it as the problem itself demands here and now." (5). He goes on to reject the overlapping consensus as ahistorical. But, at some level, his arguments seem to rest on the notion of certain principles, namely that everyone is due equal respect. Lebron simply takes these principles to be just on their own accord, which might make some sense as we're talking about values we would assume everyone would agree on. But to someone like Rawls, principles become legitimate precisely because they are timeless - they would be accepted by any reasonable person at any time. Lebron, though, wants to accept other principles he assumes are already legitimate and timeless, even though he thinks the original position has a major flaw. This leads to the situation where Lebron has simultaneously accepted certain principles (or, alternatively, people have accepted certain deep principles that can be exploited) while rejecting a scenario where they can be created. Perhaps Lebron doesn't have much of a problem here though. His theory is not as broad as Rawls, in the sense that it does not wish to redesign a basic structure or rethink justice. Rather, it seeks to look at issues of institutional practice and the failings of that practice. Since that's the case, his theory can afford to be much more narrow.

The Individual and the Institution

In my last post I began to touch on the relationship between individuals and institutions in shaping national character. I felt like there was more to say on this topic. 

There is an interesting relationship between the role of individuals and institutions in Lebron's conception of national character. He wants for us to "cultivate moral excellence" at both levels, but it is somewhat unclear as to which can or should come first. He argues that national character encompasses "our self-understanding as agents possessing the power to act morally or not," indicating the significance of our attitudes and actions as individuals. He then turns to the institutional level, examining "the way circumstances of power interact with the agency of the disadvantaged" (3). These circumstances of power are predicated on historical relationships and structures, and Lebron claims that Rawls' ideas of justice are justified on premises that neglect this fact. For racial injustice to be "systemic" it must be a part of a system. And, in our system of institutions "themselves beholden to racial historical precedent" we find them passing on "bad moral lessons," that, due to their institutional origins, are granted moral worth without dispute. How could something less than morally worthy come from our morally superior democratic system, after all? It seems that institutions fail to show us "racial inequality as driven by historical relations of power," and instead are responsible for perpetuating and legitimizing our uneven distribution of social value (5). 

Lebron then moves on to the role of the individual with his anecdote that Anna touched on. When his peer made an offensive joke, he felt that the man had "betrayed more deeply held principles" that we as people should maintain (7). He seems to change his tune, claiming that "most of the necessary rules are in place" to improve our national character, but that "the players sometimes seem unwilling to play by the spirit of the rules" (8). In the face of race, we fall short individually as well. 

I think that these inconsistencies only show up when reading Lebron incorrectly. It seems that he uses the individual and the institution interchangeably, or at least sees that they are greatly connected. If "good persons must stand alongside good institutions for justice to take hold," then we are both actors in the process of reforming "our individual selves and the polity as a collective" (6). 

National Character

Lebron believes that the US possesses a "flawed national character" and seeks to develop a theory that might "remake" it by focusing on the deconstruction of the systematic racial injustice that has plagued our society (2). In constructing what might constitute our "national character" he gestures to all of racial justice, consistency, moral equality, and social value especially as it relates to the "black identity" (4). That all people should be afforded equal, just treatment is not a new nor controversial idea, yet while it seems as though the US has largely moved on from its severely prejudiced history - one would be hard-pressed to find someone who makes their racism blatant and obvious within the realms of acceptable social behavior - Lebron is concerned that even with this "relative disappearance of explicit racism" we fail to account for the "continued marginalization of blacks and black identity" (2). In this way, as a nation, our general pattern of attitudes and actions and the normative importance we place on our relationships with others are argued to fall dishearteningly short in regard to social justice, staining our national character. 

We see the grim results, but we need a better understanding of what this means. While "black suffering has become much more difficult to catalog," that systematic racial injustice exists poses an "existential threat" to Black Americans by exposing America's "lack of consistency to the idea of moral equality," which, as Lebron points out, "has real cost for black lives" (2). From this we understand two important aspects of national character: it deals in part with internal consistency (we claim to uphold certain values as a society that are not at all translated in our attitudes and actions) and with equality (as inequality "consistently and persistently diminishes the ability of blacks to conceive and/or pursue a good life" (2)). His conception of national character presupposes the moral value of equality, which I personally find no fault with, given the inherent value it holds in a democratic society (which he in fact argues contains the resources for redemption) and the power it holds over the social and political well-being of individuals. In our society, he argues, we have a problem with social value, for "blacks do not occupy an equal place in the scheme of normative attention and concern" that is used to justify the distribution of benefits and their recipients. It follows that our current conception of distributive justice is harmfully limited, as it presumes an equality of social value that we do not possess by failing to acknowledge the "value we fail to accord black identity" (4). Our failure to account for social value in our conception of justice is certainly reflected in our poor national character. 

It seems universally accepted that people can have character. Can institutions have it as well? Lebron feels that in the same way people hold values, our democratic society too holds values such as "fairness, equality, and basic social, political, and civic reciprocity" (9). He goes further, however, claiming that while people come and go, institutions "precede and outlast generations" and lend to a sense of identity in profound ways. Yet people make up institutions, so where does the change come from? Where is social value derived from? If we find that source we will surely find what actually determines our national character beyond a list of values. 

Some Self Reflection

"'You know, the guys in the hood driving the cars with the big rims'. Everyone had a good laugh at that one. Not me. Trading easy stereotypes, the teaching assistant's comment unthoughtful remark only served to embarrass me"(7).  Lebron writes that if he had shared this event with the teacher's assistant, he or she would have been deeply ashamed. Lebron will later go one to explain that this shame comes from an incontinence between values and actions.
This exchange made me think about how we, a class with no black students, are to discuss The Color of Shame . If we said something that was shameful (incontinence between our values and actions), we might not realize. Of course, it is incredibly valuable to read and discuss this work, because this topic is valuable to many Black Americans, and thus is important to all Americans.
CMC and most of American higher education is an institution where "we learn a good deal of our moral lessons"(11). Many institutions have financially benefited from the exploitation of other classes, whether historically or presently. Our discussion of race is taking place in such an institution. With that in mind, I think we have to be conscious about how talk about Lebron. It is one thing to intellectualize the logic and premises of his account, but it is another, an arguably more comprehensive method to read a philosopher, to understand why and for whom Lebron is writing this piece.  

Nigerian Americans?

Loved this. Lebron is clearly very sociologically informed, and a terrific writer to boot.

One thing that’d come across my mind when reading this was the circumstances of Nigerian Americans. I remember hearing anecdotally that Nigerian Americans do very well, and Wikipedia appears to corroborate this: "Nigerian immigrants have the highest education attainment level in the United States, surpassing every other ethnic group in the country, according to U.S Bureau Census data. Harvard University, for example, has estimated that more than one-third of its black student body consists of recent immigrants or their children, or were mixed-race.” if there are indeed groups of black people that do well in the United States, that seems to be a problem for Lebron’s social value theory (and a boost for the goods begets goods conception). But then he brings up the case of the West Indian immigrants. It seems clear to me that when Lebron refers to blacks he is referring to “American blacks,” or people who identify as American blacks (2nd generation W.I. immigrants, or maybe 2nd gen. Nigerian immigrants too.) Through the W.I. immigrants you can see plainly how race diffracts life experience.

Sentiments in Philosophy

LeBron defines shame as the "moral response we should and tend to have when we fail to uphold principles we affirm on our own account in the face of conditions that cannot possibly be thought to justify that failure" (18). Shame, he argues, is what citizens ought to feel for permitting the continuation of implicit racial inequality in our country when we are supposed to be committed to the principles of equality.

Like Smith and Baier, LeBron appeals to human sentiment in making a philosophical argument for evaluating our actions. Baier centers around the power of trust in determining our relationships and uses this feeling as a starting place for evaluating exploitative relationships. Smith devotes much of his Theory of Moral Sentiments to discussing the importance of sympathy and similar to LeBron, suggests that individuals must assess the morality of their actions from an outsiders view (Smith's impartial spectator).

Appealing to human emotion aligns with the importance LeBron places on creating a political theory. These nonideal theories must adequately search for the solution to a problem by starting from within, as opposed to creating a theory of morality or justice without consideration of contemporary societal issues. In the same way, evoking real sentiments forces individuals to directly face the problem; we cannot escape the feelings of shame, sympathy, nor trust. Nonetheless, I understand that LeBron is taking a less conventional approach so I'd like to hear how others feel about his account.

Moral Markets?

Public regulation and structuring of incentives can align private interests with morality, to produce moral outcomes. What is the relationship between government regulations and the free market? The two are not ontologically opposed. Government regulations incentivize market outcomes, for better or for worse. Pogge writes the “the root of the evil lies not in how corporations do business, but how we regulate and incentivize them” (28). The shape and form of the free market is the product of government regulation. A more apt comparison might be how a stream’s current is the product of the rocks and terrain in the riverbed. Our current government structure imbeds incentives for producing drugs geared toward affluent consumers. Pogge’s solution is pull programs--prize money awarded based on impact--which can foster a market competition:  “A full-pull market scheme replaces a central planning solution with a competitive-market solution”(22). Companies are part of the solution to GDB because “the immense powers of free enterprise will be marshaled against the great diseases that bring so much misery”(29). If you are an opponent of the free market (What’s up, Marx?), believing that the free market caused or magnified the world’s ills, then you acknowledge the immense power of the free market, for better or worse.  But the powers of the market can be harnessed.  Can capitalism be used to eradicate the world's most fatal diseases?

In blog post on his website, Robert Reich explains, “In reality, the ‘free market’ is a bunch of rules about (1) what can be owned and traded… (2) on what terms (equal access to the internet? the right to organize unions?... (3) under what conditions… (4) what’s private and what’s public… (5) how to pay for what”. The free market is a written, constructed set of rules. Mr. Reich continues, “These rules don’t exist in nature; they are human creations. Governments don’t ‘intrude’ on free markets; governments organize and maintain them. Markets aren’t “free” of rules; the rules define them.”  Markets are the rules that define them. If the rules create the right incentives,  the market can be guided to produce the moral outcomes. 

http://robertreich.org/post/61406074983

Pogge's Poor

Pogge certainly does not agree that medicine and medical advancements should be treated in the same way that we treat things such as software and fashion. In these instances, excluding people from goods that "cost nothing at the margin" is justifiable and therefore morally permissible to him, as extending access to such innovations imposes a cost on those who would "otherwise be exclusive beneficiaries of the innovation" (5). Grace's post highlights why medical advancements and products do not enjoy the same treatment in Pogge's argument, as while he does advocate for the practical necessity of extending access to these innovations ("we have reason to want dangerous diseases to be decimated... rather thank kept around... as [they are] a massive burden on the poor and a threat to all") his true argument rests on the moral significance he sees in the fulfillment of human rights. While being unable to access the latest handbag design won't kill you, denying the world's poor access to medicine due to a similar kind of patent is "morally problematic" as it denies them their basic "right to life" (6). 

Pogge then outlines the difficulties associated with the idea that inventors enjoy some sort of transcendent "natural right" over the use of their inventions with this conception of moral justification in mind. His first point is somewhat weak, questioning the legitimacy of extensive intellectual property rights by questioning the specific "contours enshrined in the TRIPS agreements" (6). It seems easy to question the grounds upon which an international agreement is made with respect to its content and legitimacy, and so further exploring this point seems unnecessary. I am more interested in his later points, where he expands on this idea of moral justification within the context of human rights. He asks how to weigh the "natural right of inventors" in preserving exclusive access to their medical invention versus the "right to life of poor people," and seems upset that "such a person's entitlement to the products of his labor trumps the needs of others, no matter how desperate" (6). This again reinforces what I see to be his claims towards human rights, and the basis upon which actions that detract from them can be morally justified. 

To further this examination, Pogge calls upon Robert Nozick, and claims that even with his libertarian ideologies he would "require that other [inventors] be left free to replicate the latter's invention" as by depriving others of the opportunity to "invent the medicine without having to prove that they did so independently" that inventor would be creating scarcity and would not be leaving "enough and as good" for others (8). What confuses me, however, is whether Pogge is more concerned with types of inventions or the processes that lead to them. While it would seem that his argument mainly concerns the former, he states that the inventor "cannot acquire veto powers over third parties who synthesize medicine of the same type on their own - even if they heard about his prior invention or found a sample of it lost or abandoned," suggesting that the process by which a product is invented holds similar weight in this consideration. I would like to explore, along with Pogge's arguments regarding moral justifications and human rights, his ideas of type versus process in intellectual property rights (and whether that distinction is important) as it relates to Nozick and other political philosophers. 

Monopoly is Better as a Board Game

When it comes to monopolies, Pogge argues that the problem is "the monopoly pricing power [corporations] employ, even in the case of essential medicines, to incentivize pharmaceutical research." (31). Moreover, corporations find themselves in the moral quandary that "To engage in sustainable research and development of essential medicines, they must actively prevent poor people from gaining access to such medicines near marginal cost." (31). As the paper is written, however, it makes it seem as though there is a binary choice between changing the incentive structure and letting poor people die from preventable diseases. There seems to be other options, though. For instance, states could subsidize the first $X amount of sales in poor countries, allowing the company its profit while ensuring that poor people have access to the medicine.

More importantly perhaps, Pogge’s solution seems to replace one monopoly with a different one. If the central defect of the current system is the “monopoly pricing power they employ,” then how does replacing one monopoly for another actually improve everything. Perhaps the poor will have more access to medicine, but, if states (the other monopoly) opt to spend a low amount of money on drugs, pharmaceutical companies could easily begin to run into financial trouble. Any thoughts on the best way to deal with one of the two monopolies that seem necessary to exist?

Working within the status quo

Just a quick thought on Pogge's approach:

Much of Pogge's account centers around creating a plan that is both "politically feasible and realistic" (2). Thus, his full-pull idea is one that fits within the competitive-market solution. Although I agree that this is the most realistic way to go about implementing a public good strategy (one that creates open access and alternative incentives), but I do wonder whether he should consider potential institutional problems associated with a free/competitive market. He notes the importance of regulation, going so far as to say "the root of the evil lies not in how corporations do business, but in how we regulate and incentivize them" (28).

Although regulation plays a part in effectively implementing his proposal, Pogge could have considered whether a greater structural change may be needed in our current international economy. Solving problems by working within the system is generally the most effective strategy, yet from a philosophical standpoint, we can ask whether the system itself ought to be maintained.

Pogge should have made a human rights argument

In discussing about a need to introduce a plan that gives the pharmaceutical industry the financial incentives to address the health problems of the poorest in the world, Pogge starts off with several ideas that relate to our previous class discussions regarding international human rights.  Pogge writes that we must reform “current national and global rules” to incentivize the pharmaceutical industry to provide for the needs of the poorest in the world and “reach our common and imperative goal of universal access to essential medicines…” (3). To any reasonable and fairly compassionate person reading this, it may be easy to agree with Pogge in the urgency of this matter. However, to someone who does not believe that human rights are moral rules, like Beitz, and moreover does not believe that access to essential medicine is considered a human right, there would be more explaining that Pogge would need to do. This question is especially pressing after reading Beitz who emphasized that human rights is a practice, and the scope of it is whatever we can agree to. Sen would define the scope to be greater than Beitz’s, as whatever people have claim to to enhance capabilities. Nagel on the other hand would define the scope to be smaller than Beitz. 

   

Although Pogge’s account of how there are millions dying simply due to the lack of access to essential medicine is enough to convince me that there must be something done to address this problem, there may be people out there who may question the philosophical basis of why this systematic reform is necessary. Some people may raise up the questions of why we shouldn’t then as a global community do more to address famine, unclean water, lack of education in third world countries. Who would be responsible of addressing these problems? Where would the resources come from? The idea goes back to human rights and the different conceptions people have about the scope of human rights. 

 I think Pogge should have done a more thorough job of explaining his philosophical argument of why access to essential medicine for the poorest countries is so important by arguing that it is a human right. He does already give a compelling account through explaining the economic incentives for both rich and poor countries; however a philosophical argument would have further strengthened his account.

YES PHILOSOPHY

I liked Pogge’s take on the natural right of inventors. Classical liberals,in the tradition of Locke, argue that inventors have natural rights over their invention since it is an extension of their labour. Pogo points out that these natural rights only apply to a particular token, but not to all objects of its type. To own natural rights to a whole type of inventions is to create scarcity, Pogge points out, and therefore violates the Lockean proviso by “not leaving enough and as good for others.”

I find it interesting how Pogge focuses more on the prudential and beneficial reasons for reforming patent laws though. Philosophical arguments are lovely but they just don’t have much suasion over the general public. But there’s only so far you can go with the prudential arguments: I’m not sure, in the end, how convinced the well-off countries will be by the putative benefits they receive from this reform. Pogo comes back round to justice towards the end, but I would personally have preferred it if he had spent an extensive section developing that.

Thoughts about sovereignty....

Okay, so this doesn't directly have to do with Pogge's argument but there was a section of his piece that made me think about sovereignty in relation to our past discussions about global justice and human rights. One of Pogge's points about why the WTO is bad for poor countries has to do with the idea that "political power in the poor countries is typically very unevenly distributed" (12). He mentions that some may argue that poor countries must be held accountable to patent rules as laid out by the WTO because they agreed to them. "Volenti non fit iniuria - no injustice is being done to the willing" (12). Pogge argues against this idea, as it uses the inference that the consent of populations is demonstrated through the actions of their rulers. However, many poor countries have corrupt or tyrannical leaders who do not act for their people. As such, "we cannot invalidate the complaint of those now excluded from essential medicines by appealing to the prior consent of the ruler when this ruler himself lacks any moral standing to consent on their behalf" (13). Pogge notes that the international practice to recognize a ruler's power, usually regardless of how they acquired it, is common but that this leads to many problems. This made me think back to our discussion about sovereignty and the right to intervene on the basis of human rights. Pogge seems to suggest that it is right to disregard the decisions of corrupt rulers, as they often do not represent their people and sacrifice their human rights. Although I think he is correct in many cases, it is still hard to determine when sovereignty is illegitimate and when intervention is necessary. I'm curious if anyone else had any thoughts about sovereignty and legitimacy based on this section? How can we tell when a ruler accurately represents a people? Democracy does not seem to be the answer, as there can be both legitimate and illegitimate elections. I'll be interested to hear any thoughts...especially tying back to Beitz or Nagel.

Philosophy?

So this reading was obviously not a work of philosophy. As Hurley said in his post, Pogge proposes a scheme for regulating and incentivizing pharmaceutical companies. The reform would have obvious benefits, not the least of which would be the preservation of millions and millions of lives. Thus Pogge believes the scheme is morally desirable. Plus, it doesnt violate 'lockean' property rights. Justice and human rights are even mentioned briefly. But this piece is not a work of philosophy, or even of philosophical value. It's interesting and deserves attention because of it's potential benefits, but im unsure of why we're reading it in a philosophy seminar.

One of the coolest parts of the Pogge piece for me is his demonstration that intellectual property is the creation of a market failure, a monopoly, to correct for an even bigger market failure.  In a pure market if you research and develop some product, I will simply copy it and sell it for far less money (since I didn't have to sink all of that money into R&D).  As a result, it is irrational to invest in R&D -- a SPECTACULAR market failure.  What is the solution? The creation of monopolies!  That, after all, is what intellectual property is, a monopoly that is conferred by the state in certain circumstances for a certain period of time.  Monopolies are, as economists never tire of telling us, extremely inefficient, but in this case the thought is that they are less inefficient than the pure market wold be -- the lesser of two market failures, in effect.  It becomes clear once the problem is framed this way what the economic bar will be.  Any proposal that is less inefficient than the current monopolies created under the TRIPS regime will be economically preferable to TRIPS and to a pure market.  It will be messing with the pure market, but intellectual property is already messing with the pure market because the pure market fails so spectacularly to support efficient levels of research and development.  So cool!

Morality and Pragmatism in Pogge

In Intellectual Property Rights and Access to Essential Medicines, Pogge makes an argument for a reform plan to create universal access to essential medicines in collaboration with the pharmaceutical industry. Pogge refers to the problem of avoidably high morality rates in poor countries as "the morally preeminent problem of our age" (37). He clearly thinks that the main reasons that we should combat "horrendous, poverty-induced, and largely avoidable morbidity and morality in the less developed countries" are moral reasons; he says that we ought to support reform "insofar as it is necessary for rendering minimally just (in the sense of 'realizing human rights insofar as this is reasonably possible') the rules of the world economy considered as one scheme" (38).

However, in laying out the details and merits of his reform plan, Pogge refers only to the prudential reasons that corporations, and the pharmaceutical industry in general, that might compel the industry to take part in the reform. Pogge refers to the "interests" and "incentives" of corporations within the industry, even though he clearly thinks that some force of morality or justice is what really obligates us to reform the system in order to lower the morality rates of poor countries. It seems that Pogge has different standards for corporations and the decisions that they make than for individuals; the morality of corporations cannot be appealed to, because such an appeal will not be convincing for the corporations. In fact, Pogge says that the "root of the evil lies not in how corporations do business, but in how we regulate and incentivize them. If we structure markets so that corporations can earn billions by getting people to smoke, then corporations will work hard to get people to smoke . . . . It is our responsibility to restructure the patent regime so that pharmaceutical innovators lose the financial stake in the proliferation of their target diseases and gain a financial stake in the destruction and eradication of these diseases" (28-29).

I think that Pogge's characterization of corporation's tendencies is accurate; as we all know, morality tends to play no large role in determining how corporations conduct themselves. However, I think it's interesting that morality still grounds Pogge's account, but that he's able to create a reform plan that carries out the ultimate aims of justice while simultaneously creating appealing, pragmatic financial incentives for corporations. I think Pogge does a nice job of addressing the unrelated nature that often seems to exist between philosophical theories of morality and the "real world." However, I wonder what would happen if Pogge was not able to come up with a theory for how to address an ultimately moral aim in a way that appealed to the pharmaceutical industry, which he paints as merely one aspect of a larger system of incentives that the public and government have created themselves. What if there is some other moral issue that needs to be solved in the world (clearly, there are many), but there is no reform plan that will prudentially appeal to the instruments within the plan? Is it still necessary to eventually carry out that aim? Or is it hopeless at that point to try to carry out the moral aim?

Little faith in the process, less faith in the outcome

I'm really not sure what I think about Beitz's take on international norms. He relies on broad acceptance of the norms to form a conception of human rights among nations. This, in my view, is potentially dangerous because I have little faith that the majority will reach the correct norms to enforce. The potential for the majority to reach a conception of human rights that is too broad seems just as likely as the potential for the majority to fail to reach a conception that is broad enough. I'm not sure I have an alternative proposal to present, because an omnipotent state or body does not exist that could propose what these norms actually should be. I simply think that Beitz doesn't adequately address why we should ever listen to the majority of states other than that he has empirically observed the majority to reach the correct conclusion about the norms that should be enforced most of the time. Perhaps if the process of determining what the majority of states believe should constitute norms was a better one I would have more faith in the potential of international norms to ensure human rights, but as the process stands today I have little faith in the process, and less faith in the outcome.

Human rights: as a tool and as a standard

Beitz changes the question from how we ought to define human rights to how human rights are currently used on the international political scale. He develops his "'practical conception,'" which takes "doctrine and practice of human rights as we find them in international political life as the source materials for constructing a conception of human rights" (102). Beitz does not deny the importance of defining human rights, but instead focuses on creating an empirical account of how human rights are generally used as an existing global practice.

I was initially skeptic in my reception of Beitz account; does focusing on the practical use of human rights neglect the value in striving for a comprehensive version of human rights? Does using the term human rights affect how we understand "rights" as fundamental claims? I now see the strength of Beitz's practical approach: by differentiating between human rights as a moral tool (one that may develop in different ways) and as a generally-accepted set of international standards, Beitz adequately explains the importance in understanding how human rights are currently used.

One final comment- I think that given Beitz approach, he should emphasize the role that both states and individuals ought to play in regulating the accepted standards of human rights. If human rights are (and continue to be) our standard of international socioeconomic justice, we must all play an active role in regulating what these norms are and how they are enforced.

What is everyone else's take on Beitz's approach?

Ignoring Property Rights is Unwise

I wanted to point out an oversight of the "core" documents: recognition of property rights. Beitz seems to view this oversight as relatively inconsequential, he dedicates only a sentence of discussion to this point, writing, "The only significant reduction in scope concerns the right to own property: vaguely acknowledged in the declaration (art.17), it is missing altogether from both covenants." (28). To separate property rights from protection of human rights more generally, however, seems unwise. When we think about many of the rights encapsulated in human rights, protection of property rights is essential to their protection. Take one of the lesser human rights, the right to a economic system that serves one's needs. If property rights are not protected, incentives for investment are harmed, the possibility of the formation of extractive economic institutions is heightened, and individuals are distinctly harmed day in and day out through the fear that their property rights are not ensured. My intention in highlighting the lack of discussion of property rights is not to point out that any of the other rights in the "core" documents are not worthy of being protected, but that many of them are only able to be protected by a system that protects property rights. Thus, property rights are the basis for those rights, and more discussion of the role of property rights and their relation to human rights is warranted, as well as their inclusion in documentation of human rights.

One of the central question concerning Beitz's account of human rights is what it means to characterize global human rights as a "practice." He tells us on p. 42 that a practice consists of 1)a set of rules, 2)a belief ("more or less widespread") that they ought to be followed, and 3)institutions to propagate and implement them.  The suggestion is clearly that a system of domestic law is a practice, but the suggestion also seems to be that the practice of human rights is not a legal practice.  Is science a practice?  Is chess a practice? Is beer pong a practice?  Asking these kinds of questions might help us get a handle on what it means to identify human rights as a practice.  Notice that natural rights, the moral rights identified by many of our authors, are not a practice.  If enough people believe that natural moral human rights ought to be followed and set up institutions to propagate them, then they will be bound up in a practice.  But without the acceptance of any such rules and the institutions to propagate them they are not part of a practice.  Notice also that no agreement is necessary for the existence of a practice.  It could easily emerge through an invisible hand process with no agreement whatsoever; but still count as a practice.  Notice finally that when it comes to practices the question of whether a practice exists and the question of whether one ought to support, propagate, and value it, are two completely different questions.  We could agree that a practice exists, e.g. slavery in the U.S. South, but think that it is an evil practice that should be abolished.  It consisted in a set of rules, widespread belief that they ought to be followed, and institutions to propagate and implement them, but they were immoral, even evil -- part of a practice that should be undermined and abolished, not endorsed.  So the question of whether human rights are properly understood to be a practice does not answer the question of whether we should support such a practice.  Intriguing!

PS Someone new should run the Q! Let me know if you would like to run it tomorrow, and follow in the awesome footsteps of Francesca, Cole, XY, and Tim. 

Kant, Sen, and Obligations to the Poor

Ripstein, channeling Kant, writes that poverty in society in unacceptable because it creates dependence of some on others, which is inconsistent with the right to be able to use one's body as one desires. Poverty, he writes, in symbolically akin to a form of slavery, for being poor and being reliant on others for survival (through private determinations) strips one of the freedom to live life by their own terms and instead makes them beholden to others. Ripstein/Kant are attempting to provide a justification for the necessity of government (public) intervention for the sake of the poor, and some semblance of fairness or justice in a society that is bound to encounter inequality.

Amartya Sen, however, points out the dangers associated with government intervention for the sake of the poor, from an empirical perspective. He writes about the comparison between Western Europe and the United States, the former providing welfare to near 10% of their society (the unemployed), the latter closer to 5% of society. He makes a compelling case for why neither society should pat themselves on the back, in Western Europe everyone is able to live a "comfortable" life, yet those on welfare are distinctly harmed by the meaninglessness of their lives, while in the United States more individuals lead purposeful lives, but some suffer more at the hands of a less forgiving state and society. I think the latter case somewhat challenges the proposal put forth by Ripstein/Kant. If one were to characterize a reliance on private charity as a form of slavery, where one was unable to live out one's life according to their own volition, wouldn't a society predicated on a certain percentage of individuals being reliant upon government for their sustenance be yet another---albeit more comfortable---form of slavery. Distinct harm is being caused to them as well, they are simply victims of another structural form of inequality.

Secessionist Movements

Ripstein, when discussing Kant's argument, notes that "The 'legalistic' argument said that there was no juridicial mechanism through which the people could reserve to itself the right of sedition or rebellion; this further argument says that there is no people except as represented by law." (336). This is founded on the idea that the only legitimate way to exercise force is through an expression of the omnilateral will. In most cases, revolutionaries are incapable of meeting that basic justification. Nevertheless, in the case of secession, the dominant issue that emerges is what to do when there are conflicting omnilateral wills. 

Quickly, the secessionist movement I write of would have to have the following qualities: a legitimate government (think a US state) to express the omnilateral will of that polity and the grounds of the secessionist movement is inherently public (in the sense that its leaders are not seceding for private gain).  

By using the omnilateral will to secede from the government, secessionist movements raise an interesting issue. On one level, it would be easy to dismiss the claims or actions of the secessionist government as essentially a unilateral will within a broader polity. This makes some sense, given that the secessionist government, by definition, would not comply with the broader government. But this is strange in two ways. First, it means that we are to only pick the "largest" will, which seems morally arbitrary. Second, if these movements come from within what everyone regards as a legitimate government, we must take those actions themselves as being legitimate. Perhaps, at some level then, Kant and Ripstein have to take into account these movements, if only for a clearer enunciation of in what situations the omnilateral will itself is legitimate. Does anyone have any thoughts on how to resolve this conflict?  

Rights for Kant/Ripstein and Nagel

A sentence from the introduction to chapter 11 really caught my attention: "For Kantians, without institutions to make, apply, and enforce law, relations between persons could never be fully rightful" (326). In this paragraph, Ripstein discusses the right of human beings as such, which is "the entitlement of every human being to live with those others with whom he or she interacts in a rightful condition" (326). 

The difference between the innate right of human beings and the right of human beings as such struck me as somewhat similar to the difference between human rights and political rights that Nagel describes in The Problem of Global Justice. The first quote above in particular reminds me of Nagel's interpretation of political rights; institutions must exist before political rights can really exist for Nagel. The way that Ripstein, and Kant, describe the right of human beings as such, though, is more compelling for me than the way Nagel describes political rights. By saying that "relations could never be fully rightful" without institutions, Ripstein implies that political rights are absolutely necessary for all people to really have full exercise of their rights. Institutions, and law, are necessary. 

But for Nagel, political rights don't seem to be quite as inherent to the conception of the person. They are associative rights, contingent on the fact that people actually are part of a society. Nagel says that it is from "a system [of strong centralized control], and from our fellow members through its institutions, that we can claim a right to democracy, equal citizenship, nondiscrimination, equality of opportunity, and the amelioration through public policy of unfairness in the distribution of social and economic goods" (127). People have political rights as soon as they are joined together under a central authority. But until that point, it is not entirely clear if people can really claim any inherent political rights. For Kant, though, it seems as if the right of human beings as such leads us to join societies. While we might not be able to exercise our political rights until we're joined under institutions and laws, we nevertheless do have a right to be human beings as such even if we do not currently live under a political system with functioning institutions.

2am musings

Immediately upon reading "the state, through its officials, speaks and acts for all," I rejected it. Intuitively I feel this to be false. How can it possibly be true? Does anyone actually feel that Obama, or any US leader, acts for them? No, and its not merely the result of flaws in our democracy. One may assert that Obama speaks for me insofar as, through democratic processes and institutions, he speaks for the American people. But this is not really to defeat the obvious practical lunacy of saying that he speaks for me. Plus, maybe I dont accept any association with the American people. The strand that holds this all together seems to be the necessity of government. One NEEDS government to secure independence and so forth, so rejecting it is inconsistent with the demands of human nature. I guess I just disagree with or have too little knowledge of Kant's conception of such nature, which lies at the root of his political philosophy. Why cant I allow someone to use me instrumentally? Why is independence important? The claims questioned here are critical for Kant's political account, but I have seen insufficient proof of them.

The line between Barbarism/Republic, and possible implications

Let me preface this post by saying that I understand (or think I do!) why Kant thinks there can never be a right to have a revolution. He gives only one exception: and that is when a rightful condition is denied. He (or Prof. Ripstein does) characterizes it as the creation of a state rather than a revolution of a previous one. I just wanted to see if a revolution is possible.

Kant draws a distinct line between barbarism and the republic (the proper state). Both have force and authority, but only the latter has freedom. The republic has the rightful conditions in place and acts omni-laterally; the barbaric state acts only unilaterally.

My little counterpoint mostly pivots around this: exactly when is the rightful condition violated? The individuals qualms of rights violation, Kant says, must be redressed within the state. But is there a point where this becomes an inadequate response? And where a more urgent and self-directed action (i.e. revolution) is necessary?

Take a state like Qatar. Qatar is functionally speaking a state. They are ostensibly a republic. Qataris have rights. There seems to be a rightful condition in place. But in Qatar there’s a huge underclass of migrant workers who are systematically exploited. Wage slavery is almost putting it mildly. They have little to no rights. Would this be considered barbarism or an imperfect republic? What happens if some people have freedoms while others have none at all? Suppose the underclass band together and act unilaterally: is this revolution in action (overthrowing of a republic) or is it the rejection of a barbaric state and the creation of a legitimate one?

The Role of Religious Organizations in Providing for the Poor

In chapter 9, Ripstein discusses Kant’s position on the role of religious organizations in providing for the poor. Ripstein describes religious organizations to be “purely private, and [that] the fulfilling of religious obligations must be understood as instances of people pursuing purely private purposes” (282). Kant also writes that the state must be wary about religious organizations because “they claim to respond to an authority higher than the state that may conflict with it” (282).

Although I do understand the argument that is made by both Kant and Ripstein in describing religious organizations as serving private purposes, I am not fully convinced that the perfect solution is instead solely supporting the poor through taxes. By the government playing the only role in providing for the poor and not having any other organizations contribute, it is taking away the agency of the individual to act on one’s voluntary desire to do good. To this, the response will most likely be the argument that Ripstein makes about the parallelism between charity and slavery. Although I think taxes should play the main role in providing for the poor, I also think that there is an important element of individual freedom in giving out of freewill, whether it is through religious organizations or through other non-profits, in addition to the aid given to the poor through taxes. There are faith-based non-profit organizations that solely devote themselves to humanitarian aid without trying to promote their own beliefs on the people that they are helping. In other words, they are organizations that exist for the simple sake of doing good and do not have an alternative agenda, although their religious beliefs may be what prompted them to act. Although this does not answer Ripstein's criticism about his broader argument regarding charity, it does address his criticism that religious organizations are always pursuing private purposes. 

Principle of Right and Morality

Kant's categorical imperative is founded on the grounds of morality and treating people not merely as means. The principle of right, on the other hand, seems to have no moral foundation, but rather focuses on "the relations between the choice of the person of means and that of the one in need, and requires that provision be public rather than private"(285).

It appears that an "appropriate exercise of Kantian virtue" applies on the individual level, as individuals can be charitable and "make it their maxim to contribute to public schemes of provision," but the "Doctrine of Virtue" does not seem to apply in the same way to the state (283). The state's responsibility is to ensure that people have a rightful condition and are not dependent on the will of others. There is no moral obligation apparent.

My question is how and if the categorical imperative relates to the principle of right, and if states have a moral obligation in forming the general will, or only a procedural. Ripstein writes, "Although these powers are ultimately grounded in each person's innate right of humanity, they are internal requirements of a rightful condition and do not apply outside of one" (299).  Is it better that a state act from a morally neutral point-of-view in securing the rightful condition, or is it necessary that it consider humanity from a moral standpoint as well?

"United will" in practicality

The idea of an united will is fundamental to Kant's argument for redistribution and equal opportunity, a point that Ripstein emphasizes throughout Chapter 9. Legitimate acts of the state are limited to those that represent the general will of the people; as Ripstein explains, "any powers a state has must be traced to its claim to speak and act for all" (272). "The state's existence in perpetuity...is grounded in its ability to speak and at for everyone" (273). In order to be accurately represented, an individual must thus be free dependency on the choices of others (a condition that does not existent in cases of extreme poverty). A state cannot create (nor permit) the existence of private dependence therefore, and must ensure the conditions of formal equality of opportunity in order to create a body of citizens that may adequately respond to situations and choose the conditions that provide for self-respect. Ripstein explains why this standard helps permit the creation of the taxes, redistribution policies, as well as public systems of education and healthcare.

Yet this standard, that the united will limits the state to making "...arrangements for a person that that person could have agreed to, consistent with his or her rightful honor" (277) seems to presume that a general will of a society will be obvious. To maintain a government that truly fulfills the protections that a diverse society may ask for seems like a difficult standard to maintain given that these demands may conflict with others' within the same society.

I ask how this idea plays out in reality; how can we assess whether an individual would rightfully agree to any given societal condition? At what point in the scope of wealth does a person become independent from dependency? What institutional protections are needed to ensure a democracy in which all will's are represented (fully, without hinderance from others')?

Poverty, Charity, and Slavery

Although it does not seem like charity and slavery are closely linked, in chapter 9 Ripstein explains Kant's view that dependency on charity is very similar to slavery. Poverty is dependency, as "the poor are completely subject to the choice of those in more fortunate circumstances" (274). People in conditions of extreme poverty that rely on charity for their wellbeing are totally dependent on another's will. In this way, charity and slavery are both related due to the concept of choice. As Ripstein writes, "the moral outrage of slavery is the way in which one person is subject to the choice of another," but this is akin to charity (281). In both of these cases, an individual is dependent "on the grace of another" which "reduces a person to the status of a thing," which gives rise to moral outrage (282). Given this similarity between charity and slavery, Kant believes that needs must be met in the public sphere rather than the private. Poverty and dependence on charity "is institutional, because it is a consequence of the creation of enforceable property rights," so according to Kant, "support for the poor must be provided through taxes" (282). A state rules by a united will and dependency is inconsistent with this concept because a united will "is restricted by the laws the people could give themselves: they could not authorize a situation in which some are completely beholden to the choice of another" (279). As such, Ripstein explains that Kant argues for taxation and public institutions to care for people and eliminate poverty.

We have already talked some about the ideas of poverty and redistribution in class. I'm curious if anyone has any new thoughts on the topic after reading Chapter 9 of Ripstein. I find this account in favor of redistribution convincing, do other people feel similarly?

What is inequality?

In order to strengthen his "capability approach" (58) and better outline those factors that influence one's capabilities, Sen focuses on instances of poverty, and in accordance with his approach claims that it "must be seen as the deprivation of basic capabilities rather than merely lowness of incomes" (87). He insists that poverty represents much more than a mere inequality of income between individuals, and that "the instrumental relation between low income and low capability" not only exists, but "is variable between different communities" (88). This is where he begins to make his expansive (especially compared to traditional views) argument about what constitutes inequality: our understanding should "not end with income analysis only" (72). Inequality is affected by income and capability, and the relationship between them is itself affected by things like age, gender, location, and culture, among other things. Sen argues that "real poverty" is complex, and that it can be present even when individuals are living in a situation that puts them at "relative deprivation" of capabilities even when their absolute income is comparatively greater than those in other situations (89). He claims that individuals experience inequality when they are unable to afford the "same social functioning" as other members of that society, and this is why, as Franny mentions in her post, while African Americans in the US may objectively have higher earnings compared to those in less-developed nations, other factors exist that often make it difficult - or impossible - for these individuals to enjoy the same freedoms as non-black citizens. This type of inequality, while not necessarily of income, creates a kind of "social exclusion" that denies certain capabilities (89). 

Sen then begins to touch more on what Franny asks in her post: a meaningful life. Having established the argument that inequality relates to more than unequal income distribution, and that its reduction alone cannot be the "ultimate motivation for antipoverty policy" (it would miss some of the point), he touches on those things whose unequal distribution can constitute inequality: those "actual living things that one can have reason to value" (72). Here, this is accomplished through the example of unemployment, or the "opportunity of having a fulfilling occupation" (94). Sen describes the differences in social culture between the US and Europe, and how while the US faces large income inequalities, Europeans face huge unemployment deficits. He claims that because unemployment can yield many negative psychological (and other) consequences, it cannot be disregarded as irrelevant in discussions of inequality. It must matter "at least as important an issue of inequality, in its own right, as income distribution itself" (95). 

Sen argues that unemployment and its relation to a meaningful life must matter when analyzing economic inequality (95), but that the social differences between the US and Europe largely determine attitudes towards these disparities. In Europe unemployment seems more permissible than in the US due to economic and social attitudes, and Sen advocates that "underlying this contrast is a difference in attitudes towards social and individual responsibilities" between these population, which I find incredibly interesting. I'd love to discuss in seminar what the implications of this claim are. Can inequality be defined like Sen attempts to when everything is determined to be so subjective? What would constitute social exclusion and when is it more directly related to inequality and poverty? What role does living a fulfilling life play into inequality?


p.s. did anyone know we could insert gifs into these posts? no? me neither... until now

Asian Values and Korea

I'd like to talk about the "Asian values" that Sen brings up and bring in some personal insights. The question that Sen poses is whether freedom-oriented perspectives are absent in Asian traditions. In many ways, I think so. I was born in South Korea, and my family moved to America when I was six. Every time I visit my relatives in South Korea, I realize how different South Korean culture is compared to America. The culture definitely encourages uniformity and a collectivist attitude, from the style of dress to career pathways. It does not place heavy emphasis on individual rights and liberties as the United States, and there is an emphasis on duty toward your family and the country. However, I do think starting from the millennial generation, it is different. Millennials in South Korea are more likely to rise up for rights and freedoms, and "loyalty to family and obedience to the state" as mentioned by Sen seems to be of less importance.

Sen uses South Korea as one of the examples of countries that used an authoritarian government to bring about great economic success. One of the most controversial presidents in South Korea is Park Chung-Hee, who served as president from 1962 to 1979  (he is also the father of the current South Korean president). Park came to power through a military coup d'etat that overthrow the Korean Second Republic. He is credited with having brought about the "Miracle on the Han River," the period of great economic growth in South Korea until 1979.  However, his rule also brought about numerous human rights abuses. He formed powerful relationships with the "chebols," large conglomerate family-controlled firms  in South Korea, and he struck down all labor rights movements. Because of the low wages paid to laborers harsh working conditions, the companies were able to make their products so cheap that it attracted the business that led to the economic prosperity in South Korea. Opinions are pretty split about Park. Many Koreans think that South Korea would not be where it is right now without Park. Others believe that it still does not justify the human rights abuses that his rule brought about. This goes back to the fundamental question of whether the ends justify the means. Obviously Sen would say that it does not, and the case in South Korea is an exception to how development should and is brought about.

Human Rights

In chapter 10, I found Sen's discussion on the"oratory of human rights" to be particularly interesting. He mentions three critiques:

(1) legitimacy critique: the concept of human rights that are not defined by states conflict with legal proceedings
(2) coherence critique: there are not agencies to ensure human rights, so therefore we cannot say someone has a right to something if no one is assigned to provide it to them
(3) cultural critique: human rights cannot be universal as different cultures have different ethical values

In response, I ask:

(1) Sen responds, "A human can be effectively invoked in contexts even where its legal enforcement would appear to be most inappropriate,"and give the example of the "right to respect." My question is, do you think humans are born with human rights? Are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness not inherently human or "inalienable" rights and built into the legal systems, because humans should not be denied such things, simply because they are humans?
(2) Do you think Kant's "imperfect obligations" are binding enough that we, as humans, should protect the rights of others?
(3) Do you think individualistic or communal attitudes better support the realization of Sen's freedoms?

Markets and Freedom

I thought it would be interesting to discuss Sen's references to economics, markets, and utility maximization as this falls in line with many of our prior readings. Sen's capabilities outlook provides, in my opinion, a better reason for a free market. He writes, "it can still be argued that there is some social loss involved in denying people the right to interact economically with each other." Markets do provide efficiency, but this is not the primary reason we should support them. When describing a the scenario of economic efficiency under a dictator, Sen adds, "[a citizen] may still have very good reason to prefer the scenario of free choice over that of submission to order."

I think this is why I like Sen so much. He gives grounded (moral?) reasons for operating a state in a certain way. It's not just that a state should produce the best outcomes (although I know he is a consequentialist), but the intrinsic significance of ensuring freedoms is also valued. He seems to find a way to rationalize the realization of the best outcomes in a way that is morally sound.

The ability to live a meaningful life

Sen discusses income as not only a means to live, but also to "achieve actual livings that one can have reason to value" (73). This extends the evaluation of poverty beyond income and even access to food, healthcare, etc., to the ability of an individual to function in society without deprivation. As he notes, the "relative deprivation in terms of incomes can yield absolute deprivation in terms of capabilities" (89). He notes that even if an individual may have a higher absolute income in terms of world standards, being relatively poor in a rich country can be a great handicap.

I like this version of inequality as deprivation because it accounts for variances in cultural/societal standards; rather than arguing that African-Americans are better off (in terms of income) than the relatively poor in countries like India, which diminishes the level of adversity this group truly faces, Sen promotes weighing the importance of capability to participate in society. Social exclusion, which results from being unable to participate meaningfully in a community, inhibits the ability of an individual to participate in the political and economic spheres of that society. This not only hinders an individual's ability to succeed, but also to live a life that the society would consider meaningful in the least.

I also understand that this view may generate criticism. How did you guys receive this idea?

Can We Measure Freedom?

A couple classes ago, in a discussion about Ripstein, Tyler said that we tend to focus more on numerical measurements of nations (GDP, purchasing power, exchange rates, ext.) as an indication of quality of life rather than more qualitative qualifications, like freedom. It is just harder to measure freedom directly, and harder to quantify. Sen moves us closer to directly identifying which countries give their citizens more freedom. But he shies away from putting a numerical value on freedom. Sen writes, " I have also not attempted to produce an 'aggregate' measure of deprivation, based on 'weighting' the different aspects of capability deprivation. A constructed aggregate may often be far less interesting for policy analysis that the substantive pattern of diverse performances" (103).  I agree with Sen in that an analysis illuminates what metrics often obscure. However, counting freedoms might be possible.

I think we could list all the freedoms gained or lost due to a societal feature (like welfare programs, income inequality, right to bare arms) for a set of individuals. Then, we could add the freedoms or subtract the unfreedoms for each set of individuals, and then we could arrive at a sum of freedoms. This would only be interesting if, through an analysis, it wasn't clear which country gave citizens more freedom.   For example, Europe and the United States diffing levels of unemployment and income inequality, that yield different freedoms and unfreedoms. They seem to be sort of at a tie. Sen explains that "American social ethics seems to find it possible to be very non-supportive of the indigent and the impoverished, in a way that a typical Western European, reared in a welfare state, finds hard to accept. But the same American social ethics would find the double-digit levels of unemployment, common in Europe quite intolerable"(95). But which country is more free? We could apply this little math trick to see which situation either more equality, more unemployment or less equality, less unemployment generates more freedoms for sets of individuals and fewer unfreedoms for sets of individuals. Maybe if we could start to quantify freedom on a rudimentary level, we could talk more directly about freedom, instead about indirect measurements of quality of life.