Although it does not seem like charity and slavery are closely linked, in chapter 9 Ripstein explains Kant's view that dependency on charity is very similar to slavery. Poverty is dependency, as "the poor are completely subject to the choice of those in more fortunate circumstances" (274). People in conditions of extreme poverty that rely on charity for their wellbeing are totally dependent on another's will. In this way, charity and slavery are both related due to the concept of choice. As Ripstein writes, "the moral outrage of slavery is the way in which one person is subject to the choice of another," but this is akin to charity (281). In both of these cases, an individual is dependent "on the grace of another" which "reduces a person to the status of a thing," which gives rise to moral outrage (282). Given this similarity between charity and slavery, Kant believes that needs must be met in the public sphere rather than the private. Poverty and dependence on charity "is institutional, because it is a consequence of the creation of enforceable property rights," so according to Kant, "support for the poor must be provided through taxes" (282). A state rules by a united will and dependency is inconsistent with this concept because a united will "is restricted by the laws the people could give themselves: they could not authorize a situation in which some are completely beholden to the choice of another" (279). As such, Ripstein explains that Kant argues for taxation and public institutions to care for people and eliminate poverty.
We have already talked some about the ideas of poverty and redistribution in class. I'm curious if anyone has any new thoughts on the topic after reading Chapter 9 of Ripstein. I find this account in favor of redistribution convincing, do other people feel similarly?
Wednesday, April 15, 2015
Thursday, April 9, 2015
What is inequality?
In order to strengthen his "capability approach" (58) and better outline those factors that influence one's capabilities, Sen focuses on instances of poverty, and in accordance with his approach claims that it "must be seen as the deprivation of basic capabilities rather than merely lowness of incomes" (87). He insists that poverty represents much more than a mere inequality of income between individuals, and that "the instrumental relation between low income and low capability" not only exists, but "is variable between different communities" (88). This is where he begins to make his expansive (especially compared to traditional views) argument about what constitutes inequality: our understanding should "not end with income analysis only" (72). Inequality is affected by income and capability, and the relationship between them is itself affected by things like age, gender, location, and culture, among other things. Sen argues that "real poverty" is complex, and that it can be present even when individuals are living in a situation that puts them at "relative deprivation" of capabilities even when their absolute income is comparatively greater than those in other situations (89). He claims that individuals experience inequality when they are unable to afford the "same social functioning" as other members of that society, and this is why, as Franny mentions in her post, while African Americans in the US may objectively have higher earnings compared to those in less-developed nations, other factors exist that often make it difficult - or impossible - for these individuals to enjoy the same freedoms as non-black citizens. This type of inequality, while not necessarily of income, creates a kind of "social exclusion" that denies certain capabilities (89).
Sen then begins to touch more on what Franny asks in her post: a meaningful life. Having established the argument that inequality relates to more than unequal income distribution, and that its reduction alone cannot be the "ultimate motivation for antipoverty policy" (it would miss some of the point), he touches on those things whose unequal distribution can constitute inequality: those "actual living things that one can have reason to value" (72). Here, this is accomplished through the example of unemployment, or the "opportunity of having a fulfilling occupation" (94). Sen describes the differences in social culture between the US and Europe, and how while the US faces large income inequalities, Europeans face huge unemployment deficits. He claims that because unemployment can yield many negative psychological (and other) consequences, it cannot be disregarded as irrelevant in discussions of inequality. It must matter "at least as important an issue of inequality, in its own right, as income distribution itself" (95).
Sen argues that unemployment and its relation to a meaningful life must matter when analyzing economic inequality (95), but that the social differences between the US and Europe largely determine attitudes towards these disparities. In Europe unemployment seems more permissible than in the US due to economic and social attitudes, and Sen advocates that "underlying this contrast is a difference in attitudes towards social and individual responsibilities" between these population, which I find incredibly interesting. I'd love to discuss in seminar what the implications of this claim are. Can inequality be defined like Sen attempts to when everything is determined to be so subjective? What would constitute social exclusion and when is it more directly related to inequality and poverty? What role does living a fulfilling life play into inequality?
p.s. did anyone know we could insert gifs into these posts? no? me neither... until now
Sen then begins to touch more on what Franny asks in her post: a meaningful life. Having established the argument that inequality relates to more than unequal income distribution, and that its reduction alone cannot be the "ultimate motivation for antipoverty policy" (it would miss some of the point), he touches on those things whose unequal distribution can constitute inequality: those "actual living things that one can have reason to value" (72). Here, this is accomplished through the example of unemployment, or the "opportunity of having a fulfilling occupation" (94). Sen describes the differences in social culture between the US and Europe, and how while the US faces large income inequalities, Europeans face huge unemployment deficits. He claims that because unemployment can yield many negative psychological (and other) consequences, it cannot be disregarded as irrelevant in discussions of inequality. It must matter "at least as important an issue of inequality, in its own right, as income distribution itself" (95).
Sen argues that unemployment and its relation to a meaningful life must matter when analyzing economic inequality (95), but that the social differences between the US and Europe largely determine attitudes towards these disparities. In Europe unemployment seems more permissible than in the US due to economic and social attitudes, and Sen advocates that "underlying this contrast is a difference in attitudes towards social and individual responsibilities" between these population, which I find incredibly interesting. I'd love to discuss in seminar what the implications of this claim are. Can inequality be defined like Sen attempts to when everything is determined to be so subjective? What would constitute social exclusion and when is it more directly related to inequality and poverty? What role does living a fulfilling life play into inequality?
p.s. did anyone know we could insert gifs into these posts? no? me neither... until now
Asian Values and Korea
I'd like to talk about the "Asian values" that Sen brings up and bring in some personal insights. The question that Sen poses is whether freedom-oriented perspectives are absent in Asian traditions. In many ways, I think so. I was born in South Korea, and my family moved to America when I was six. Every time I visit my relatives in South Korea, I realize how different South Korean culture is compared to America. The culture definitely encourages uniformity and a collectivist attitude, from the style of dress to career pathways. It does not place heavy emphasis on individual rights and liberties as the United States, and there is an emphasis on duty toward your family and the country. However, I do think starting from the millennial generation, it is different. Millennials in South Korea are more likely to rise up for rights and freedoms, and "loyalty to family and obedience to the state" as mentioned by Sen seems to be of less importance.
Sen uses South Korea as one of the examples of countries that used an authoritarian government to bring about great economic success. One of the most controversial presidents in South Korea is Park Chung-Hee, who served as president from 1962 to 1979 (he is also the father of the current South Korean president). Park came to power through a military coup d'etat that overthrow the Korean Second Republic. He is credited with having brought about the "Miracle on the Han River," the period of great economic growth in South Korea until 1979. However, his rule also brought about numerous human rights abuses. He formed powerful relationships with the "chebols," large conglomerate family-controlled firms in South Korea, and he struck down all labor rights movements. Because of the low wages paid to laborers harsh working conditions, the companies were able to make their products so cheap that it attracted the business that led to the economic prosperity in South Korea. Opinions are pretty split about Park. Many Koreans think that South Korea would not be where it is right now without Park. Others believe that it still does not justify the human rights abuses that his rule brought about. This goes back to the fundamental question of whether the ends justify the means. Obviously Sen would say that it does not, and the case in South Korea is an exception to how development should and is brought about.
Sen uses South Korea as one of the examples of countries that used an authoritarian government to bring about great economic success. One of the most controversial presidents in South Korea is Park Chung-Hee, who served as president from 1962 to 1979 (he is also the father of the current South Korean president). Park came to power through a military coup d'etat that overthrow the Korean Second Republic. He is credited with having brought about the "Miracle on the Han River," the period of great economic growth in South Korea until 1979. However, his rule also brought about numerous human rights abuses. He formed powerful relationships with the "chebols," large conglomerate family-controlled firms in South Korea, and he struck down all labor rights movements. Because of the low wages paid to laborers harsh working conditions, the companies were able to make their products so cheap that it attracted the business that led to the economic prosperity in South Korea. Opinions are pretty split about Park. Many Koreans think that South Korea would not be where it is right now without Park. Others believe that it still does not justify the human rights abuses that his rule brought about. This goes back to the fundamental question of whether the ends justify the means. Obviously Sen would say that it does not, and the case in South Korea is an exception to how development should and is brought about.
Human Rights
In chapter 10, I found Sen's discussion on the"oratory of human rights" to be particularly interesting. He mentions three critiques:
(1) legitimacy critique: the concept of human rights that are not defined by states conflict with legal proceedings
(2) coherence critique: there are not agencies to ensure human rights, so therefore we cannot say someone has a right to something if no one is assigned to provide it to them
(3) cultural critique: human rights cannot be universal as different cultures have different ethical values
In response, I ask:
(1) Sen responds, "A human can be effectively invoked in contexts even where its legal enforcement would appear to be most inappropriate,"and give the example of the "right to respect." My question is, do you think humans are born with human rights? Are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness not inherently human or "inalienable" rights and built into the legal systems, because humans should not be denied such things, simply because they are humans?
(2) Do you think Kant's "imperfect obligations" are binding enough that we, as humans, should protect the rights of others?
(3) Do you think individualistic or communal attitudes better support the realization of Sen's freedoms?
(1) legitimacy critique: the concept of human rights that are not defined by states conflict with legal proceedings
(2) coherence critique: there are not agencies to ensure human rights, so therefore we cannot say someone has a right to something if no one is assigned to provide it to them
(3) cultural critique: human rights cannot be universal as different cultures have different ethical values
In response, I ask:
(1) Sen responds, "A human can be effectively invoked in contexts even where its legal enforcement would appear to be most inappropriate,"and give the example of the "right to respect." My question is, do you think humans are born with human rights? Are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness not inherently human or "inalienable" rights and built into the legal systems, because humans should not be denied such things, simply because they are humans?
(2) Do you think Kant's "imperfect obligations" are binding enough that we, as humans, should protect the rights of others?
(3) Do you think individualistic or communal attitudes better support the realization of Sen's freedoms?
Markets and Freedom
I thought it would be interesting to discuss Sen's references to economics, markets, and utility maximization as this falls in line with many of our prior readings. Sen's capabilities outlook provides, in my opinion, a better reason for a free market. He writes, "it can still be argued that there is some social loss involved in denying people the right to interact economically with each other." Markets do provide efficiency, but this is not the primary reason we should support them. When describing a the scenario of economic efficiency under a dictator, Sen adds, "[a citizen] may still have very good reason to prefer the scenario of free choice over that of submission to order."
I think this is why I like Sen so much. He gives grounded (moral?) reasons for operating a state in a certain way. It's not just that a state should produce the best outcomes (although I know he is a consequentialist), but the intrinsic significance of ensuring freedoms is also valued. He seems to find a way to rationalize the realization of the best outcomes in a way that is morally sound.
I think this is why I like Sen so much. He gives grounded (moral?) reasons for operating a state in a certain way. It's not just that a state should produce the best outcomes (although I know he is a consequentialist), but the intrinsic significance of ensuring freedoms is also valued. He seems to find a way to rationalize the realization of the best outcomes in a way that is morally sound.
Wednesday, April 8, 2015
The ability to live a meaningful life
Sen discusses income as not only a means to live, but also to "achieve actual livings that one can have reason to value" (73). This extends the evaluation of poverty beyond income and even access to food, healthcare, etc., to the ability of an individual to function in society without deprivation. As he notes, the "relative deprivation in terms of incomes can yield absolute deprivation in terms of capabilities" (89). He notes that even if an individual may have a higher absolute income in terms of world standards, being relatively poor in a rich country can be a great handicap.
I like this version of inequality as deprivation because it accounts for variances in cultural/societal standards; rather than arguing that African-Americans are better off (in terms of income) than the relatively poor in countries like India, which diminishes the level of adversity this group truly faces, Sen promotes weighing the importance of capability to participate in society. Social exclusion, which results from being unable to participate meaningfully in a community, inhibits the ability of an individual to participate in the political and economic spheres of that society. This not only hinders an individual's ability to succeed, but also to live a life that the society would consider meaningful in the least.
I also understand that this view may generate criticism. How did you guys receive this idea?
I like this version of inequality as deprivation because it accounts for variances in cultural/societal standards; rather than arguing that African-Americans are better off (in terms of income) than the relatively poor in countries like India, which diminishes the level of adversity this group truly faces, Sen promotes weighing the importance of capability to participate in society. Social exclusion, which results from being unable to participate meaningfully in a community, inhibits the ability of an individual to participate in the political and economic spheres of that society. This not only hinders an individual's ability to succeed, but also to live a life that the society would consider meaningful in the least.
I also understand that this view may generate criticism. How did you guys receive this idea?
Can We Measure Freedom?
A couple classes ago, in a discussion about Ripstein, Tyler said that we tend to focus more on numerical measurements of nations (GDP, purchasing power, exchange rates, ext.) as an indication of quality of life rather than more qualitative qualifications, like freedom. It is just harder to measure freedom directly, and harder to quantify. Sen moves us closer to directly identifying which countries give their citizens more freedom. But he shies away from putting a numerical value on freedom. Sen writes, " I have also not attempted to produce an 'aggregate' measure of deprivation, based on 'weighting' the different aspects of capability deprivation. A constructed aggregate may often be far less interesting for policy analysis that the substantive pattern of diverse performances" (103). I agree with Sen in that an analysis illuminates what metrics often obscure. However, counting freedoms might be possible.
I think we could list all the freedoms gained or lost due to a societal feature (like welfare programs, income inequality, right to bare arms) for a set of individuals. Then, we could add the freedoms or subtract the unfreedoms for each set of individuals, and then we could arrive at a sum of freedoms. This would only be interesting if, through an analysis, it wasn't clear which country gave citizens more freedom. For example, Europe and the United States diffing levels of unemployment and income inequality, that yield different freedoms and unfreedoms. They seem to be sort of at a tie. Sen explains that "American social ethics seems to find it possible to be very non-supportive of the indigent and the impoverished, in a way that a typical Western European, reared in a welfare state, finds hard to accept. But the same American social ethics would find the double-digit levels of unemployment, common in Europe quite intolerable"(95). But which country is more free? We could apply this little math trick to see which situation either more equality, more unemployment or less equality, less unemployment generates more freedoms for sets of individuals and fewer unfreedoms for sets of individuals. Maybe if we could start to quantify freedom on a rudimentary level, we could talk more directly about freedom, instead about indirect measurements of quality of life.
I think we could list all the freedoms gained or lost due to a societal feature (like welfare programs, income inequality, right to bare arms) for a set of individuals. Then, we could add the freedoms or subtract the unfreedoms for each set of individuals, and then we could arrive at a sum of freedoms. This would only be interesting if, through an analysis, it wasn't clear which country gave citizens more freedom. For example, Europe and the United States diffing levels of unemployment and income inequality, that yield different freedoms and unfreedoms. They seem to be sort of at a tie. Sen explains that "American social ethics seems to find it possible to be very non-supportive of the indigent and the impoverished, in a way that a typical Western European, reared in a welfare state, finds hard to accept. But the same American social ethics would find the double-digit levels of unemployment, common in Europe quite intolerable"(95). But which country is more free? We could apply this little math trick to see which situation either more equality, more unemployment or less equality, less unemployment generates more freedoms for sets of individuals and fewer unfreedoms for sets of individuals. Maybe if we could start to quantify freedom on a rudimentary level, we could talk more directly about freedom, instead about indirect measurements of quality of life.
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