Concepts and Conceptions

In the first chapter, Rawls explains the difference between a concept and conception of justice. He writes, “the concept of justice I take to be defined, then, by the role of principles in assigning rights and duties and in defining the appropriate division of social advantages. A conception of justice is an interpretation of this role” (Rawls, 9). If conception is the interpretation of concept, is it possible to have a just concept, but an unjust conception? 

To examining the idea of opposing conception and concept of justice, let’s imagine that the pairing of conception and concept is relevantly similar to a house and its blueprint: a house is an interpretation of a blueprint in the same way a conception is an interpretation of a concept. It is possible that a house’s blueprint seems structurally sound, but the house itself, once build, is unstable. Maybe, in similar way, the concept is just, but the conception, or the concept’s interpretation, is unjust. The best example I think of this might be dichotomy between the declaring all men are created equal and then denying Black Americans the right to vote, among many other things. It is just to profess, as rule of distributing rights and duties, that everyone is entitled to the same rights. But somehow that conception of justice was lost in interpretation when it came to giving Blacks the right to vote. If it’s possible to have a just concept and an unjust conception, how can the just concept some how lost in interpretation?

Rawls and Rational Choice

I think it’s important to note the different reasons Locke, Hobbes, and Rawls give for entering society (or for Rawls, having a certain system), while understanding their common driver – rational choice. For Hobbes, the goal of the system is self-preservation, so people enter society in order to preserve themselves. This is an idea of rational choice at its most basic, where a decision is made for a person’s survival. For Locke, he is concerned about property, but broadly defined to include “life, liberty, and estate.” People enter society in order to protect their rights and prevent the chaos that occurs in the absence of a common authority. In both cases, society occurs because it is in the greater interest for those individual people, as they are situated, to enter into society.

Rawls, when applying his ideas of the original position and the veil of ignorance, also uses rational choice. As he notes, there “are principles that free and rational persons concerned to further their own interests would accept in an initial position of equality as defining the fundamental terms of their association.” (10). By decontextualizing people from the environment where they make their decisions, however, he subtly changes the idea of rational choice. Under Hobbes and Locke, it seems to coalesce around the individual and what is good for him, but with Rawls it becomes about the community. As he puts it, “principles of justice [chosen by rational persons] deal with conflicting claims upon the advantages won by social cooperation; they apply to the relations among several persons or groups.” (15). In a certain way, Rawls is using rational choice to correct for the excesses that can result from rational choice (unequal distribution, capture of the state by certain interests/classes, etc.). Moreover, he is expanding a circle, previously focused on just the individual, to draw an eye toward society. In that way, his idea of justice is fundamentally different than that of Locke especially. Locke is concerned in the sense that they safeguard the individual and his rights, as is Rawls. The next step is expanding the idea of rational choice to include the community as well. Nevertheless, this seems to raise questions over the scope of rational choice, if there are any, and the effects of rational choice on Rawls’s theory.

Rawls on Equality and Justice/ Justice vs. Law of Nature

Rawls asserts that justice does not arise "from an original agreement in a situation of equality" (p.13). Rather, justice must be established first, as it "is the first virtue of social institutions" (3).  He uses the principle of utility to support his point and argues that this principle will not stand if there is only the understanding of equality and not justice, due to human selfishness. If there was no sense of justice in a society in which people viewed themselves as equals, it is hard to imagine people agreeing "to a principle which may require lesser life prospects for some simply for the sake of a greater sum of advantages for others" (13). An individual will act to protect only his interests without the understanding of justice. Therefore, "in the absence of strong and lasting benevolent impulses, a rational man would not accept a basic structure merely because it maximized the algebraic sum of advantages irrespective of its permanent effects on his own basic rights and interests." The principle of utility cannot operate in a society of equals that only look out for their own interests and cannot work toward a mutual advantage. 

Locke, on the other hand, uses the law of nature to introduce justice. The law teaches that "no one ought to harm another in his life, health, or possessions." Although Locke does not directly introduce the idea of justice, there is a sense of fairness and respect between human relationships that is established through his law of nature. One can argue, however, that someone could get away with an act that is unjust but does not violate the law of nature. The law of nature prohibits the harming of another person's life or possessions. The idea of justice, as introduced by Rawls, goes further to use it to explain social relationships in which individuals must be mindful of the common good or the interests of the general public. For example, a man might hoard available land at the expense of his neighbor. However, since the man did not steal from his neighbor or harm him to get the land, this act does not go against Locke's law of nature. Rawls, however, may assert that the man is not upholding justice by hoarding the land because it goes against the idea of justice as fairness. 

Two things I’d like to talk about in this blog post: (in)equality and the different definitions of justice from Hobbes through to Rawls.

I’m a soc major who’s always been very interested in socio-economic inequality, so I was pretty excited to read what Rawls had to say on this. I find liberal equality very intuitively appealing — it is most fair, after all; arbitrariness of birth and favor really gets to me — but I’d be silly to ignore the arguments against it. Rawls puts up a very convincing case against it (the fight for equality never ends, can never end.) For those of you who were at the Ath talk this Monday, there was another case against liberal equality (however polemic): that efforts (affirmative action, say) spent towards that end could even be pareto sub-optimal. 

Rawls doesn’t hold that strict liberal interpretation of equality. His idea of equality depends on what he calls the difference principle. My reading of what he says: inequality is okay as long as the difference principle is obeyed, which says that the actions/policies that benefit the favored in society are acceptable as long as the least-favored benefit in some way from it. The chain connection is a transmission mechanism in this process: if the least-favored benefit, then those adjacent to them on the socio-economic ladder will benefit slightly as well (magnitude depends on close-knittedness.) [How well do I represent Rawls’ here? Feel free to come at this if I’m off-base!]

Francesca mentioned Hobbes, Locke et al in reference to Rawls, and I thought it’d be cool to see the different way Rawls handles justice compared to the British pair. Rawls’ conception of justice as a virtue, as something that with a moral core, is much closer to our contemporary (and my personal intuitive understanding) of justice in my opinion. Hobbes and Locke only consider it within the institution of society — this Rawls calls formal justice. Rawls begins with justice as a first principle: society, which itself is a gestalt of institutions, can be judged as just or unjust. I find this to be a lot more relatable an understanding, anyone else feel the same way?

Something to keep an eye out for.  Many interpreters of Rawls believe that the core argument for his two principles does not appear where he says that it does, in the middle sections of chapter 3, but in secs. 11-13 of chapter 2 (particularly in sec. 12).  Others believe that the core argument for his two principles appears in a late section of chapter 3, sec. 29.  We will be focusing on the sec. 29 argument for tutorial, but it is very helpful, both for that paper and for understanding Rawls, to focus on the secs. 11-13 (particularly sec. 12) argument as well.  See you tomorrow for class at 1:15 at The Press!

Equality, justice and liberty (and all of their meanings)

Each of the authors we have read thus far (Hobbes, Locke, Marx, and now Rawls) each have a unique understanding of these ideas of equality, justice and liberty. According to Hobbes, individuals are equal in the state of nature because they are able to freely compete and preserve themselves through any means. Liberty similarly exists in the natural absence of impediment on one's freedom fulfill their needs. Justice, on the other hand, can only exist under the social contract and therefore pushing individuals into join society. 

In comparison, Locke understands equality as a result of no one having power over another. There are two types of liberty for Locke: natural and social, the first pertaining to only being ruled by the laws of nature and the second to be free from rule under any government except that founded by the consent of the commonwealth. The government resulting from the social contract upholds justice, which to Locke, means protecting personal property and liberty. Marx is of course, far more critical of the ideas of equality, justice and liberty, understanding each as a false promise under the capitalist state and only truly existing under communism.

Rawls, in his A Theory of Justice, again discusses these three ideas. Unlike the others, Rawls believes both equality and liberty are the result of the state of justice. His principle of justice as fairness results from individuals beginning in the "original position" in which they can decide (without any subjective ideas) what is just and what is not. This ultimately results in a society that guarantees basic liberties (compatible with liberties for all others) and only allows social and economic inequalities to exist if to benefit the least advantaged.

All of these concepts (freedom, equality, justice) are in fact the foundation of our American society. Although our notion of these principles do not align exactly with any of these philosophers, each offer an aspect that has been combined into our cultural understanding and how we work to uphold these ideals. 

Locke's Consent vs. Rawls's Voluntary Scheme

In "The Main Idea of the Theory" (p. 12), Rawls offers an account of how people can come to live under the duties and obligations of a society without voluntarily expressing their consent to live in that society. This is a question that both Locke and Smith also discuss; Locke believes that both express and tacit consent explain how a society can legitimately claim power over citizens, while Smith believes that individual consent has nothing to do with how governments maintain power.
Rawls proposes another account of how society can assign obligations and duties to its citizens, which I find to be more convincing than Locke's: "No society can, of course, be a scheme of cooperation which men enter voluntarily in a literal sense; each person finds himself placed at birth in some particular position in some particular society, and the nature of this position materially affects his life prospects. Yet a society satisfying the principles of justice as fairness comes as close as a society can to being a voluntary scheme, for it meets the principles which free and equal persons would assent to under circumstances that are fair. In this sense its members are autonomous and the obligations they recognize self-imposed" (12).  Rawls's account implies that a government is not legitimate simply because citizens enjoy and use the benefits/land belonging to that society, which is a weakness present in Locke's account of tacit consent. Rawls goes a step further than Locke in considering what a "legitimate" government really is: not just one to which people seem to have agreed to by living under it, but one that also conforms to principles of justice that would be considered just by all people in the original position. Other thoughts on how Rawls's interpretation of a "voluntary scheme" compares with Locke's/Smith's lack thereof?